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Abstract 
  A key question for Social Security reform is whether workers currently perceive 
the link on the margin between the Social Security taxes they pay and the Social Security 
benefits  they  will  receive.    We  estimate  the  effects  of  the  marginal  Social  Security 
benefits  that  accrue  with  additional  earnings  on  three  measures  of  labor  supply: 
retirement, hours, and labor earnings.  We develop a new approach to identifying these 
incentive effects by exploiting five provisions in the Social Security benefit rules that 
generate discontinuities in marginal benefits or non-linearities in marginal benefits that 
converge to discontinuities as uncertainty about the future is resolved. We find clear 
evidence that individuals approaching retirement (age 52 and older) respond to the Social 
Security tax-benefit link on the  extensive margin of their labor supply decisions: we 
estimate that a 10 percent increase in the net-of-tax share reduces the two-year retirement 
hazard by a statistically significant 2.1 percentage points from a base rate of 15 percent.  
The evidence with regards to labor supply responses on the intensive margin is more 
mixed: we estimate that the elasticity of hours with respect to the net-of-tax share is 0.41 
and  statistically  significant,  but  we  do  not  find  a  statistically  significant  earnings 
elasticity. 
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findings and conclusions expressed are solely those of the authors and do not represent the views of SSA, 
any agency of the Federal Government, or the NBER.     1 
1. Introduction 
  A  common  argument  is  that  investment-based  Social  Security  reform  will 
improve  economic  efficiency  by  increasing  the  perceived  link  between  retirement 
contributions and retirement benefits (Auerbach and Kotlikoff, 1987; Kotlikoff, 1996; 
Feldstein and Liebman, 2002).  Under this argument, individuals currently perceive the 
Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) payroll tax as a pure tax, failing 
to recognize that the payment of Social Security taxes will increase their future Social 
Security  benefits.    With  personal  retirement  accounts,  in  contrast,  the  link  between 
contributions and future income would be clear, and the economic distortions would be 
reduced.    A  notional  defined-contribution  system  could  similarly  produce  efficiency 
gains by making the tax-benefit link more transparent. 
  Though  economists  have  long  recognized  Social  Security’s  tax-benefit  link 
(Browning,  1975;  Blinder  et  al.,  1980;  Burkhauser  and  Turner,  1985),  there  is  little 
evidence as to whether people perceive the Social Security tax as a pure tax or whether 
they instead realize that the effective marginal Social Security tax rate (the nominal tax 
rate minus the marginal Social Security benefit rate) is generally lower than the nominal 
Social  Security  tax  rate.    To  our  knowledge,  no  papers  have  examined  whether  the 
effective Social Security tax rate affects labor supply as measured by hours or earnings.  
While  there  is  an  extensive  literature  analyzing  the  effect  of  Social  Security  on 
retirement, Diamond and Gruber (1999) note that most of this literature ignores the effect 
of the marginal Social Security benefit rate (focusing instead on the effects of the level of 
Social Security Wealth).  Moreover, as we explain later, nearly all of the papers that do 
account for accrual confound the retirement incentives with the benefit claiming date 
incentives.  We  instead  isolate  the  retirement  labor  supply  incentives.  We  see  this, 
together with our examination of labor supply responses on the intensive-margin (hours 
and earnings), as the first major contribution of this paper.  
  A challenge that faces all research on the incentive effects of Social Security is 
the  concern  that  variation  in  these  incentives  may  be  correlated  with  unobserved 
determinants  of  labor  supply.    Structural  models  explicitly  exclude  such  unobserved 
determinants from the utility function and instead focus on the question of whether the 
resulting preferences in combination with the Social Security rules can explain observed   2 
retirement  patterns  (Gustman  and  Steinmeier,  1986,  2005a;  Rust  and  Phelan,  1997; 
Laitner and Silverman, 2008).  Research that exploits variation over time in the Social 
Security rules can deal with this concern by using sharp variation in the generosity of 
benefits that applies to certain cohorts, as Krueger and Pischke (1992) did when using the 
variation generated by the “notch generation.”
1  Most research that uses cross-sectional 
variation in incentives attempts to address the concern by including determinants of these 
incentives as control variables.  This approach has become feasible since the early 1980s 
when datasets were first matched with administrative Social Security earnings histories.  
Such  matched  data  were  used  in  papers  by  Fields  and  Mitchell  (1984),  Burtless  and 
Moffitt (1984), Hausman and Wise (1985), Burtless (1986), Sueyoshi (1989), McCarty 
(1990),  Vistnes  (1994),  and  Blau  (1997).    If  all  determinants  of  the  incentives  are 
included as controls, as is done in Coile (2004) and Coile and Gruber (2007) but not in 
the earlier papers, the resulting estimates will be identified off of the non-linearities in the 
incentive schedule that are not absorbed by the control variables.  The estimates will be 
unbiased if unobserved determinants of labor supply are uncorrelated with these non-
linearities.  This  is  more  likely  when  the  non-linearities  are  strong  and  vary  across 
individuals,  as  is  the  case  with  Samwick’s  (1998)  variation  in  specific  pension  plan 
features across individuals in different firms.  As explained in more detail below, we 
develop a methodology in which the estimated incentive effects are identified only off of 
provisions in Social Security benefit rules that generate discontinuities in incentives.  By 
relying on this variation, we substantially reduce the scope for bias in our estimates from 
unobserved determinants of labor supply that are correlated with general non-linearities 
in  the  Social  Security  benefit  rules.    We  see  this  methodology  as  the  second  major 
contribution of this paper. 
The  Social Security  benefit  formula  contains  a number  of  provisions  that  can 
create  large  variations  in  the  effective  marginal  tax  rate  for  otherwise  very  similar 
individuals (Boskin et al., 1987; Feldstein and Samwick, 1992).  In particular, we exploit 
discontinuities generated by five provisions of the Social Security benefit formula.  First, 
                                                 
1 While there has been little sharp variation over time in Social Security benefit rules in the U.S., other 
countries have made changes in the public pension system that creates effective variation in incentive and 
income effects across cohorts and years.  Manoli et al. (2008) use such variation in the case of Austria to 
identify the incentive and income effects of the public pension system on retirement decisions.   3 
Social Security benefits depend on only the 35 highest years of indexed earnings, thus 
creating  jumps  in  effective  Social  Security  tax rates  that  depend  on  which  years  are 
included among the 35 highest years.  Second, an individual receives total benefits that 
are the greater of either 100 percent of the person’s own retired worker benefits or 50 
percent of the benefit of the individual’s spouse, thus creating a discontinuity in marginal 
benefits around the point where the Social Security benefit of one spouse is double that of 
the other spouse.  Third, the provisions governing Social Security benefits for widows 
and  widowers  create  discontinuities  in  marginal  benefits.    Fourth,  kink  points  in  the 
Social Security benefit schedule create discontinuities in marginal benefits, and, fifth, 
there is a discontinuity at the point where the individual reaches sufficient quarters of 
earnings (generally 40, but lower for earlier cohorts) to become vested. 
Together,  these  five  provisions  potentially  create  sharp  discontinuities  in  the 
effective Social Security tax rate when there is no uncertainty about the future labor 
supply of the individual and his or her spouse.  When there is still uncertainty about 
future  labor  supply,  these  provisions  can  create  non-linearities  that  converge  to 
discontinuities as the uncertainty gets resolved.  We use the term “discontinuities-in-the-
limit”  to  refer  both  to  actual  discontinuities  and  to  non-linearities  that  converge  to 
discontinuities.  We develop a variant of the standard regression discontinuity approach 
so that the effects of the Social Security benefit rules on labor supply are identified off of 
the variation created by these discontinuities-in-the-limit.  Our regressions include linear 
controls for all variables that determine the marginal Social Security tax rate, as well as 
many interactions and higher-order terms of these variables.  We develop a criterion that 
determines how flexible these controls need to be in order to preserve sufficient variation 
due  to  discontinuities-in-the-limit  but  absorb  virtually  all  other  variation.    Since  the 
variation  from  the  discontinuities-in-the-limit  identifies  our  estimates,  these  estimates 
would be biased only in the unlikely case that unobserved determinants of labor supply 
are discontinuous or exhibit strong non-linearities at exactly the same points as the ones 
created by these five provisions in the Social Security benefit rules.  We therefore believe 
it is reasonable to consider our estimates as measuring the causal effects of marginal 
Social Security benefits.    4 
We perform our estimation using observations from the original cohort of the 
Health and Retirement Study (HRS).
2  The HRS is a longitudinal survey of individuals, 
and the original cohort includes people born between 1931 and 1941, as well as their 
spouses.  The original cohort has been interviewed every two years, starting in 1992.  We 
obtained  permission  to  link  HRS  observations  to  the  administrative  Social  Security 
earnings  records  of  HRS  sample  members.    We  find  clear  evidence  that  individuals 
respond to the Social Security tax-benefit link on the extensive margin of their labor 
supply decisions: we estimate that a 10 percent increase in the net-of-tax share reduces 
the two-year retirement hazard by a statistically significant 2.1 percentage points from a 
base rate of 15 percent.  The evidence with regard to labor supply responses on the 
intensive margin is more mixed: we estimate that the elasticity of hours with respect to 
the net-of-tax share is 0.41 and statistically significant.  We do not find a statistically 
significant earnings elasticity, though point estimates do suggest a positive elasticity, as 
well. 
Qualitatively, and in terms of statistical significance, the extensive-margin labor 
supply responses are quite robust to changes in specification, but the magnitude of the 
point  estimates  varies  somewhat  across  specifications.    The  intensive-margin  labor 
supply  responses  are  more  sensitive  to  changes  in  specification.    Though  we  lack 
statistical power to estimate results within subsamples precisely, the retirement response 
appears to be driven mostly by the female subsample, while the hours response appears to 
come from the male subsample.  Overall, our results clearly allow us to reject the notion 
that labor supply is completely unaffected by the tax-benefit link in Social Security.  Our 
estimates, however, are not sufficiently precise to determine the exact degree to which 
individuals  perceive  this  tax-benefit  link.    They  are  consistent  both  with  a  complete 
perception of the tax-benefit link and with only a very small fraction of the tax-benefit 
link being perceived.  
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows:  In section 2, we explain the provisions 
in  the  Social  Security  benefit  rules  that  give  rise  to  discontinuities-in-the-limit  and 
develop  a  methodology  that  exploits  variation  from  these  discontinuities-in-the-limit. 
                                                 
2 The HRS is sponsored by the National Institute of Aging (grant number NIA U01AG009740) and is 
conducted by the University of Michigan.  We use the RAND HRS Version F Data file (2008).   5 
Section  3  explains  the  data  and  our  empirical  specifications.    Section  4  presents  the 
results, and section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2.  Methodology 
 
2.1  Brief description of the Social Security benefit rules 
  Social Security retirement benefits in the U.S. are based on a worker’s lifetime 
earnings record.  Each year of earnings during a worker’s career is indexed to the wage 
level of the year the worker turns 60 by multiplying the earnings by the ratio of average 
earnings in the year the worker turns 60 to the average earnings in the year in which the 
earnings  were  earned.    Earnings  after  age  60  are  not  indexed.    A  worker’s  average 
indexed monthly earnings (AIME) are calculated by summing the indexed earnings from 
the worker’s highest 35 years of indexed earnings (including zeros if the worker worked 
for fewer than 35 years) and then dividing by 420 (35 × 12).  Only earnings up to the 
maximum taxable earnings level (currently $102,000) are included in the calculations.  A 
progressive benefit formula is then applied to determine the worker’s primary insurance 
amount (PIA).  This benefit formula replaces 90 percent of average earnings over an 
initial segment, 32 percent over a second segment, and 15 percent of earnings over a final 
segment.   
  The PIA is the monthly benefit a worker receives if he or she retires at the full 
retirement age (FRA) and claims benefits as a retired worker.  The PIA is indexed for 
inflation. Workers may claim benefits as early as age 62, with a permanent reduction in 
benefits of about 6 2/3 percent per year prior to the FRA.  Workers who delay claiming 
beyond the FRA receive increased benefits from the delayed retirement credit for each 
year they postpone claiming.  However, delays in claiming beyond age 70 do not result in 
increased benefits.  In married couples, the lower-earning individual receives a benefit 
that is the greater of his or her own benefit or 50 percent of the benefit of the higher-
earnings spouse.  Widows and widowers receive benefits equal to the maximum of their 
own benefits and the full benefits of their deceased spouses. 
   6 
2.2  Sources of discontinuities-in-the-limit in marginal Social Security benefits 
We  identified  twelve  provisions  in  the  Social  Security  rules  that  generate 
discontinuities-in-the-limit.  Because some of these provisions depend on variables not 
recorded  in  our  data  set  or  apply to  relatively  few  individuals,  we  are  left  with  five 
provisions that generate the variation we exploit in our empirical analysis.
3 
First,  we  exploit  the fact  that Social  Security  benefits  depend  on  only  the  35 
highest years of indexed earnings (the “35-year rule”).  After 35 years of earnings, an 
additional year of earnings will increase benefits only inasmuch as the additional year of 
earnings exceeds a year of lower earnings.  If this additional year is not among the 35 
highest  years,  then  there  is  no  marginal  increase  in  benefits  from  additional  work.  
Moreover,  if  there  is  some  chance,  given  uncertainty  about  future  earnings,  that  the 
additional year will no longer be among the 35 highest years of earnings at the point the 
person’s  Social  Security  benefits  are  calculated,  then  the  35-year-rule  reduces  the 
marginal returns to work.  If the additional year of earnings is among the 35 highest, then 
the average returns from working the additional year are greater, the lower were the 
earnings in the replaced year. However, the marginal returns to working an additional 
hour are not affected by the level of earnings in the replaced year because, on the margin, 
additional earnings do not displace prior earnings. 
Second,  the  rules  on  spousal  benefits  create  variation  in  the  effective  Social 
Security tax rate. This variation consists of non-linearities that converge to discontinuities 
as uncertainty about future own and spousal labor supply gets resolved. An individual 
                                                 
3 Social Security discontinuities not studied in this paper include: (1) Income taxation of benefits – The 
1993 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act increased the fraction of Social Security benefits subject to 
income taxation for higher-income individuals, thus increasing effective Social Security tax rates for those 
individuals.  (2) Divorce – Eligibility for spousal benefits upon divorce is limited to individuals who were 
married for at least 10 years, thus creating a discontinuity in marginal Social Security benefits at 10 years 
of marriage for individuals who might claim spousal or widow benefits.  (3) Remarriage – Individuals lose 
eligibility for spousal benefits based on an ex-spouse upon remarriage prior to age 60, thus creating jumps 
in marginal Social Security benefits upon remarriage for the subgroup of individuals who would have 
claimed benefits based on an ex-spouse’s earnings.  (4) The Windfall Elimination Provision – This 
provision places workers who receive a government pension from a job in a sector not covered by Social 
Security on a different benefit schedule.  (5) Changes in state “double-dipping” laws – These laws prevent 
workers from receiving state pensions from SS-ineligible government work if they are claiming any Social 
Security, thus effectively forcing many workers not to take Social Security benefits.  (6) The “Special 
Minimum PIA” – This creates variation in effective marginal Social Security benefit rates for workers with 
similar lifetime earnings but with different year-by-year earnings histories.  (7) Children’s benefits – Minor 
children of retirees are eligible to receive 50 percent of the retiree’s benefits, which creates variation in 
effective marginal Social Security benefits based on the age difference between the parent and child.   7 
receives total benefits that are the greater of 100 percent of the person’s own retired 
worker benefit or 50 percent of the benefit of the individual’s spouse. When benefits are 
calculated, this creates a discontinuity at the point where the ratio of own to spousal PIA 
equals 0.5 because individuals will claim benefits on the spousal record when the ratio 
falls below 0.5.  In this case, there is no link on the margin between own labor earnings 
and Social Security benefits.  A similar discontinuity occurs when the PIA ratio reaches 
2.0  because,  at  this  point,  the  individual’s  spouse  will  also  claim  benefits  on  the 
individual’s earnings record.  When this occurs, it will discontinuously increase the tax-
benefit linkage on the margin by about 50 percent.
4  
Third, there is variation due to rules regarding widow or widower benefits.  An 
individual with a living spouse receives the maximum of her own Social Security benefit 
or 50 percent of her spouse’s benefit, while someone with a deceased spouse receives the 
maximum of her own benefit and 100 percent of her deceased spouse’s benefit.
5  Thus, 
individuals with a living spouse will claim their own benefits in a future year with the 
probability that their own benefits exceed 50 percent of their spouse’s benefits and the 
spouse  is  alive  in  that  year,  plus  the  probability  that  their  own  benefits  exceed  100 
percent of their spouse’s benefits and the spouse is deceased in that year.  Thus, even for 
those with a living spouse, the marginal returns to work drop discontinuously if the ratio 
of own to spousal PIA falls below one because this severs the link between work and the 
value of benefits received if widowed.  Of course, any uncertainty about future own and 
spousal labor supply will generate uncertainty about the value of the PIA ratio at the time 
of benefit claiming, turning the discontinuity into a non-linearity in the return to work 
around the earnings level where the PIA ratio equals one. 
Fourth, the AIME-PIA conversion schedule contains three segments.  In the first 
segment the PIA increases by $0.90 for every dollar increase in the AIME, in the second 
segment this figure is $0.32, and in the third segment it is $0.15.  These kinks in the 
AIME-PIA conversion schedule create two discontinuities in the returns to work.  First, 
                                                 
4 The increase is exactly 50 percent if the individual and the spouse are the same age, have the same life-
expectancy and retire at the FRA.  In other cases, differences in life expectancy and early retirement 
adjustments or delayed retirement credits can cause this increase to be somewhat larger or smaller than 50 
percent. 
5 As with spousal benefits, early retirement adjustments or delayed retirement credits may result in slightly 
different values.   8 
the marginal returns to work are (90-32)/90=64 percent lower for those who end up on 
the  second  segment  rather  than  on  the  first  segment  of  this  schedule.  Second,  the 
marginal returns to work are (32-15)/32=53 percent lower for those ending up on the 
third segment rather than on the second one.  For those who still face uncertainty about 
which segment they will be on, the returns to work will be a weighted average of the 
returns to work at each of the segments, weighted by the probabilities of ending up on 
each.  This uncertainty about future earnings turns the discontinuities into non-linearities 
in the returns to work around the earnings levels that lead the expected AIME to cross the 
kink points. 
Fifth, individuals need a certain number of quarters of earnings (generally 40) to 
qualify for benefits.  This rule reduces the returns to work for earnings generated before 
this vesting limit is reached by the probability that this limit will still not be reached by 
the time the person claims benefits.   
These five sources of discontinuities interact in multiple ways.  For example, the 
35-year rule and the vesting rule do not generate variation in the effective marginal Social 
Security  tax  rate  for  someone  who  will  claim  spousal  benefits.    Similarly,  the 
discontinuity due to widow benefits will create a greater jump in the effective marginal 
Social Security tax rate for someone who is on the 32 percent segment of the AIME-PIA 
schedule than for someone on the 15 percent segment of this schedule.  Our methodology 
also exploits the variation in the effective marginal Social Security tax rates generated by 
interactions among the five provisions. 
 
2.3  A methodology to exploit discontinuities-in-the-limit  
If  individuals  had  perfect  foresight,  we  could  use  a  standard  regression 
discontinuity design to exploit the discontinuities generated by the five provisions in the 
Social  Security  benefit  rules  we  discussed  above  (e.g.,  see  Hahn  et  al.  2001  for  the 
standard regression discontinuity design).  In particular, we could calculate the present 
discounted value of all future Social Security benefit payments for person i and his or her 
spouse:  SSWit(Xi,t-1,Xi,t-1
+ ), where (Xi,t-1,Xi,t-1
+ ) is the vector of individual characteristics 
(including own and spousal earnings) that determine Social Security benefit payments. 
This vector consists of a component,Xi,t-1, that is known at time t-1, and a component,   9 
Xi,t-1
+ , that is not yet known at that time (except under perfect foresight). The person 
would face an effective Social Security tax of: 
 
(1)   it
effective(Xi,t-1,Xi,t-1
+ ) =  t
nominal    SSWit(Xi,t-1,Xi,t-1
+ )/  yit , 
 
where the derivative of SSW with respect to current income, yit, would be evaluated at the 
predicted  value  of  current  income  (based  on  past  income)  to  avoid  a  mechanical 
relationship between current labor supply decisions and the effective tax rate.  We could 
then run a standard regression discontinuity specification to estimate the effects of the 
marginal tax rate on a measure of labor supply, hit:  
 
(2) hit =   1  it
effective(Xi,t-1,Xi,t-1
+ ) ( )+ f(Xi,t-1,Xi,t-1
+ , )+ Zit  +  it , 
 
where Zit is a vector of other explanatory variables for labor supply, while α, β, and γ are 
parameters to be estimated, and ε is an error term. The functional form of the net-of-tax 
share,1  it
effective ,  is  determined  by  the  Social  Security  benefit  formula  and,  critically, 
contains  discontinuities.    By  contrast,  the  function  f(.)  is  a  continuous  but  flexible 
function of exactly the same characteristics that determine the net-of-tax share. If f(.) is 
sufficiently flexible, then α, the labor supply response to the Social Security net-of-tax 
share, would be identified exclusively by the discontinuities in the net-of-tax share. 
  In reality, of course, some of the determinants of Social Security benefits are not 
yet known at the time when the labor supply decision is made.  We therefore estimate the 
labor supply response to the expected net-of-tax share by: 
 
(3) hit =   1  E[ it
effective | Xi,t-1] ( )+ f(Xi,t-1, )+ Zit  +  it , 
 
Due to the expectation operator, E[.], many discontinuities in the effective marginal tax 
rate turn into non-linearities.  These non-linearities would be fully absorbed by f(.) if we 
were to allow f(.) to be an arbitrarily flexible function of Xi,t-1, and, as a result, the labor 
supply response to the net-of-tax share would no longer be identified.  This creates a   10 
dilemma.  On the one hand, we want f(.) to be sufficiently flexible to capture any relation 
between past determinants of the expected effective Social Security tax rate (Xi,t-1) and 
unobserved determinants of labor supply (εit). On the other hand, we require sufficient 
remaining variation in the effective marginal tax rate to identify the labor supply effects.  
The key to our methodology is the creation of a criterion that allows us to determine 
whether the control function f(.) is sufficiently flexible. 
  To determine the flexibility needed in f(.), we first calculate the effective marginal 
Social  Security  tax  under  a  hypothetical  set  of  Social  Security  rules  that  have  been 
stripped of the provisions that create discontinuities.  We refer to the Social Security rules 
stripped  of  these  provisions  as  the  “smoothed”  Social  Security  benefit  rules.    In 
particular, we (i) eliminate the 35-year rule by letting the smoothed AIME be equal to the 
sum of all indexed earnings (rather than the sum of the 35 highest years of indexed 
earnings) divided by 35, (ii) assume, instead of the rules on spousal and widow/widower 
benefits, that each individual receives a fixed percentage of the benefits based on the own 
record  and  a  fixed  percentage  of  the  benefits  of  the  spousal  record,  where  these 
percentages are given by the actual percentages received on average by people in our data 
set  that  have  the  same  sex,  own  work/retirement  status,  marital  status,  and  spousal 
work/retirement status, (iii) replace the kinked AIME-PIA schedule by the best-fitting 
quadratic schedule, and (iv) eliminate the vesting rule.  The resulting “smoothed” Social 
Security  rules  closely  resemble  the  actual  rules,  except  that  they  no  longer  contain 
discontinuities.   
Next, we use these smoothed rules to calculate a smoothed expected effective 
Social  Security  tax  rate  ( it
Smoothed )  using  exactly  the  same  method  that  we  used  to 
calculate the actual expected effective Social Security tax rate from the actual Social 
Security benefit rules.  We then run auxiliary regressions of the form:  
 
(4) hit =   1  E[ it
Smoothed | Xi,t-1] ( )+ f(Xi,t-1, )+ Zit  +  it , 
 
In these regressions, the effect of the smoothed effective tax rate on labor supply 
is purely identified off of non-linearities in the Social Security benefit schedule such as 
the  progressive  nature  of  the  AIME-PIA  schedule  (now  modeled  as  a  quadratic   11 
relationship)  or  the  fact  that  the  present  discounted  value  of  benefits  increases  as 
individuals age (since older individuals are closer to receiving benefit payments than 
younger  people  are).    Even  though  some  of  this  variation  may  be  valid,  we  are  not 
comfortable using it because many of these non-linearities may be gradual and could 
plausibly be correlated with unobserved determinants of labor supply.  To ensure that 
none  of  this  variation  drives  our  main  estimates  (from  equation  3),  we  increase  the 
flexibility of the functional form of the control function f(.) until the estimate of α in the 
auxiliary regressions (equation 4) becomes completely insignificant. We then use that 
functional form for the control function in the main regression.     
  This approach ensures that the estimate of the effect of the effective marginal 
Social Security tax rate on labor supply (as estimated by equation 3) is driven by the 
variation  in  effective  tax  rates  from  the  five  provisions  in  the  Social  Security  rules 
described  in  section  2.2.    These  provisions  create  discontinuities-in-the-limit  that  are 
specific in the sense that they appear at particular earnings levels (e.g. at earnings such 
that PIA ratios reach 0.5, 1.0 or 2.0).  Since unobserved determinants of labor supply are 
unlikely to be discontinuous or exhibit strong non-linearities at exactly the same points as 
the ones created by these five provisions in the Social Security benefit rules, we think it is 
reasonable to treat the resulting estimates as causal.  
  In interpreting our estimates of the coefficient α, it is worth noting that workers 
may  make  labor  supply  decisions  over  multi-year  horizons  and  substitute  hours 
intertemporally.  For example, the 35-year rule may cause workers to avoid working a 
36
th year while simultaneously increasing their earnings in each of the 35 prior years.  
The coefficient α is therefore a combination of static responses by individuals with short 
planning horizons and intertemporal shifting by those with longer horizons.  
 
3.  Data and Empirical Implementation 
 
3.1 Data 
We perform our estimation using data from the original cohort of the Health and 
Retirement  Study  (HRS),  a  longitudinal  survey that  can  be  linked  to  Social  Security 
earnings records.  This cohort consists of individuals born between 1931 and 1941 as   12 
well  as  their  spouses,  who  were  born  between  1900  to  1974  (with  90  percent  born 
between 1928 and 1947).  Individuals were first interviewed in 1992 and have been re-
interviewed every two years.  Our data extend through the seventh wave of the HRS, 
which was conducted in 2004.  In total, the original cohort of the HRS includes 12,582 
individuals who were interviewed at least once. 
Key to our analysis is the fact that we have historical Social Security earnings 
records for most members of the original cohort of the HRS and their spouses.  These 
records include yearly earnings (up to the Social Security contribution ceiling) from 1951 
through 1991.
6  In addition, the HRS contains self-reported earnings for odd-numbered 
years beginning in 1991, which allows us to extend our calculations of expected Social 
Security Wealth beyond 1991 to each survey date.   
We use several variables from the HRS to construct a measure of retirement.  The 
HRS measures contemporaneous self-reported retirement status at each survey date, as 
well as the year and month that each individual retired (if the individual reports being 
retired).  In some cases, however, individuals report being retired but nevertheless report 
substantial labor earnings after their retirement date.  We therefore define a worker as 
retired if the worker says he or she is “fully retired” and if his or her earnings are below 
$2500.
7  For details on the exact construction of the retirement status variable as well as 
precise definitions of all other variables, see Appendix 1.  
The  HRS  survey  data  also  contain  the  two  other  dependent  variables  for  our 
regressions: earnings and hours worked per week.  The first of these is self-reported, with 
answers corresponding to the previous year.  Our hours worked variable is the sum of the 
usual hours per week individuals report working on their primary and secondary job 
measured at the time of the survey.  In addition, the HRS contains necessary control 
variables for our analysis, including age, sex, education, race, industry and occupation of 
the longest job held, Census region of residence, and total household wealth.  Data are 
collected semi-annually in even years, but financial variables other than household wealth 
correspond to the year prior to the survey year. 
                                                 
6 Social Security benefits for individuals in our sample do not depend on earnings from years prior to 1951. 
7 As a robustness check, we construct two alternative retirement definitions.  One is based solely on the 
earnings record, ignoring all self-reported retirement data, and the other is based solely on self-reported 
retirement data, ignoring all earnings data.   13 
In constructing our analysis sample, we exclude individuals who could not be 
linked to administrative Social Security records themselves or whose spouse could not be 
linked (about one-third of potential observations).  We also exclude individuals who were 
already retired before the initial wave of the HRS or who had very weak past labor force 
attachment  (about  17  percent  of  potential  observations).    In  addition,  we  exclude 
widowed, separated, and divorced individuals in cases for which we have insufficient 
information about their former spouses to calculate benefits (about 11 percent of potential 
observations).  Furthermore, we exclude anyone who reports ever having been disabled in 
the HRS (about 6 percent of potential observations), as disability changes Social Security 
incentives in ways that we do not have sufficient information to model correctly.  Other 
sample restrictions result in much smaller numbers of dropped observations, leaving us 
with a sample of 3,971 individuals (2,269 men and 1,702 women) out of the 12,582 
individuals in the original HRS cohort.  See Appendix Table 1 for a full list of sample 
selection criteria.  For our analysis of hours and earnings, slightly fewer observations are 
included, as described in the appendix table. 
We limit our sample to person-year observations on those individuals who had not 
yet retired as of the prior wave of the HRS.  In addition, since the primary respondents in 
the original HRS cohort are all age 52 or older, we include spouse person-years in our 
analysis sample only if the spouse is 52 years or older in that year.  Taking all of these 
restrictions into account, our sample consists of 13,902 person-year observations. 
Table 1 shows summary statistics for the key variables in our data. In each (two-
year) wave, an individual has approximately a 15.1 percent chance of retiring and this 
hazard rate does not vary significantly by sex.  Conditional on working, the average male 
respondent works almost 42 hours per week, while the average female respondent works 
35 hours per week.  Mean Social Security Wealth discounted at a 3 percent real rate is 
$272,153.  Nearly all sample members, male and female, have had sufficient earnings 
histories  to  be  eligible  for  Social  Security  benefits  as  retired  workers.    Because,  in 
constructing our sample, we dropped most of the individuals who were non-married at 
the time of the first wave of the HRS, 92 percent of the person-year observations in our 
analysis sample came from married individuals. The average age is 60 for men and 58 for   14 
women.  On average, men have had earnings in 37 prior years and women in 27 prior 
years.  
Figure  1  shows  annualized  two-year  retirement  hazard  rates  by  gender.    The 
figure shows that there is a considerable age range within which retirement hazard rates 
are substantial.  We find that for both men and women the retirement hazard rate more 
than doubles from 6 percent to above 12 percent between ages 60 to 62 and then remains 
relatively constant thereafter.
8   
 
3.2 Calculating Expected Social Security Wealth 
We define the effective Social Security tax rate as the nominal Social Security tax 
rate (10.6 percent)
9 minus the expected Social Security marginal benefit rate, where this 
benefit rate is defined as the marginal effect of current labor supply on expected Social 
Security Wealth.  Thus, the calculation of Social Security Wealth is a key element of our 
analysis.  In addition, we include Social Security Wealth as a control variable in our 
regressions. 
For  married  sample  members,  we  define  Social  Security  Wealth  as  the 
combination of own and spousal Social Security Wealth.  More specifically, it is the 
expected  present  discounted  value  of  all  payments  from  the  Social  Security 
Administration to the individual and his or her spouse.  Future Social Security benefits 
are calculated using the current Social Security benefit rules, ignoring the possibility that 
legislative reforms will alter program rules. We implement the Social Security benefit 
rules exactly to the extent we have the required information, and in our implementation 
incorporate rules on the treatment of spousal benefits, widow benefits, benefit reductions 
for early retirement, the delayed retirement credit, and the vesting rule based on quarters 
of earnings.
10  We model the benefits workers can claim on their own earnings record and 
                                                 
8 We do not show retirement hazards beyond the age of 70 because we have fewer than 100 observations in 
each age-gender cell for ages 71 or greater. 
9 We exclude the disability insurance component of OASDI, as DI benefits are not incorporated into our 
model.  Cushing (2005) shows that for older workers the effective DI tax rate converges to the statutory 
rate.  In our sample, it would therefore add little variation in labor supply incentives. 
10 We do not model the Special Minimum PIA because, by our calculation, it would apply to less that 0.1 
percent of our observations.  In addition, we do not incorporate the Windfall Elimination Provision or state 
“double dipping laws” because we do not have the necessary information to do this.  We exclude 
individuals with more than 10 years of non-FICA-covered work, and thus these provisions would apply to 
very few of the observations that remain.  In order to model them, we would need more detailed   15 
any  additional  benefits  they  are  entitled  to  based  upon  the  record  of  their  living  or 
deceased spouse.  We updated the benefit calculation (i) when the individual first claims 
benefits, (ii) when the individual first becomes eligible to claim benefits on the spousal 
record, (iii) when the spouse dies, or (iv) if claiming widow benefits, when the individual 
first becomes eligible to claim benefits on his or her own record.
11  Further details of the 
benefit calculation are spelled out in Appendix 2. 
Future Social Security benefits are a non-linear function of (i) own year of birth, 
(ii) spousal year of birth, (iii) own earnings history, (iv) spousal earnings history, (v) 
future own earnings, (vi) future spousal earnings, (vii) year of own death, (viii) year of 
spousal death, (ix) year in which the individual starts claiming benefits, and (x) year in 
which the spouse starts claiming benefits.  Year of birth and earnings history are known, 
but the remaining eight variables are generally stochastic.
12  Thus, future Social Security 
benefits are an expectation with respect to eight variables.  We reduce the dimensionality 
of this expectation by specifying the year of benefit take-up as a function of age and year 
of retirement (so, conditional on age and year of retirement, year of benefit take-up is not 
stochastic and we do not need to take an expectation over it).  In particular, we assume 
the individual starts claiming benefits in the year of retirement with two exceptions: (i) if 
the individual retires before the early retirement age, we assume that the individual starts 
claiming benefits at age 62 (even if widowed and eligible at age 60), and (ii) we assume 
those who are not retired at age 70 will nevertheless start claiming benefits then (there is 
never  any  benefit  to  delaying  claiming  benefits  beyond  age  70  because  the  delayed 
retirement credit does not increase after age 70).  To reduce the computational burden, we 
further assume that retirement occurs no later than at age 80 and that death occurs no later 
than at age 100. 
                                                                                                                                                
information than the HRS includes about current or former work for state or the federal government, as 
well as pension rules applicable to such work.  We also do not include child benefits (payable if the retiree 
has own dependent children under the age of 18) in our calculation, as they, too, apply to very few 
individuals in our sample. 
11 The alternative of optimizing which benefits to take each year (rather than just at these four life events) 
would add a great deal more complexity to our calculations but would change Social Security Wealth only 
minimally for most individuals.  Coile et al. 2002 report that fewer than 10 percent of men retiring by the 
age of 62 delay claiming by a year or more.  Delays in claiming by a year or more are even less prevalent 
for those retiring after the age of 62. 
12 In some cases, some of these variables are no longer stochastic.  For example, if the spouse is no longer 
alive, year of spousal death is not stochastic.    16 
We model future earnings as follows: We calculate the age- and gender-specific 
probability  of  future  labor  force  participation  based  on  the  age-  and  gender-specific 
retirement hazard rates.  We calculate expected future earnings conditional on being in 
the labor force by applying the age- and gender-specific earnings growth to each year’s 
earnings.
13  Finally, the probability distribution of year of death is taken from the gender-
specific  cohort  life  tables  used  by  the  Social  Security  Administration,  adjusted  for 
mortality differences by race and education using the estimates from Brown et al. (2002).  
We assume that, conditional on own and spousal age, the own and spousal year of death 
and retirement are independent.  
 
3.3 The Expected Effective Social Security Tax Rate 
The Social Security benefit schedule generally has different incentive effects on 
the extensive and intensive margins of labor supply.  Following the convention in public 
economics, we measure the incentive effect by the log of the net-of-tax share, ln(1-τ), 
where  τ  is  the  effective  marginal  Social  Security  tax.    This  specification  has  the 
advantage that, if the outcome variable is also specified in logs, the coefficient on ln(1-τ) 
can be interpreted as a price elasticity. 
To  capture  the  incentives  on  the  intensive  margin,  we  define  the  expected 
effective Social Security Intensive-margin Net-of-Tax Share (INTS) for individual i in 
year t as: 
 
(5)     INTSit = ln(1  0.106 /1.053+  SSWit /  ˆ yit), 
 
where SSWit denotes the individual’s expected Social Security Wealth at time t, and    ˆ yit  
denotes the person’s predicted pre-Social Security tax earnings for year t.
14  Because 
INTS is endogenous to the current year’s earnings, we evaluate INTS at the predicted 
                                                 
13 We take this approach because Coile and Gruber (2007) found that a simple method of growing earnings 
at a constant rate had the best predictive performance.  An alternative but computationally even more 
intensive approach would be to generate a series of earnings trajectories for each individual, calculate 
incentives separately for each trajectory, and then average over all of the possible trajectories.  
14 The 10.6 percent OASI tax is based on the contract earnings, which exclude the employer’s share of the 
tax.  Thus the tax as a fraction of the pre-Social Security tax earnings is 10.6/1.053=10.1 percent.   17 
level of earnings, which is formed by applying the age- and gender-specific earnings 
growth rates to the person’s previous year’s earnings. 
To  capture  the  incentives  on  the  extensive  margin,  we  calculate  the  average 
effective Social Security tax rate if the individual retires at the very end rather than at the 
very beginning of the current year.
15  We define the expected effective Social Security 
Extensive-margin Net-of-Tax Share (ENTS) for individual i in year t as: 
 
(6) 
   
ENTSit = ln 1  0.106 /1.053+ SSWit(retire in t +1)  SSWit(retire in t) ( )/ ˆ yit ( ). 
 
To ensure that the ENTS captures the effects of working for an additional year, rather 
than the effects of delaying claiming benefits by one year, we assume benefits are first 
claimed in year t+1 (or at age 62 if year t+1 occurs before age 62) when calculating both 
SSWit(retire in t+1) and SSWit(retire in t). This separation of the retirement incentives 
from  the  benefit  claiming  incentives  is  in  contrast  to  most  of  the  existing  empirical 
literature  on  retirement  incentives,  a  literature  in  which  marginal  incentives  to  an 
additional year of work are calculated under the assumption that when people continue 
working for one more year they also delay claiming for one more year.
16  While for many 
individuals the labor supply and claiming decisions do indeed coincide, the efficiency 
arguments  for  personal  accounts  or  notional  defined-contribution  systems  rely  on  a 
misperception of the link between the work decision (rather than the claiming decision) 
and the level of future benefits. 
 
 
4. Results 
 
4.1 Effective Social Security Net-of-Tax Shares  
                                                 
15 We acknowledge, but do not model, the option value in the decision not to retire, as highlighted by Stock 
and Wise (1990).  An interesting extension would be to take a peak-value approach as in Coile and Gruber 
(2007) since this would make it possible to account in part for the fact that returns to work in later years 
might affect the decision whether or not to retire in the current year.   
16 Rust and Phelan (1997) is a notable exception in which these two decisions are treated separately.  Coile 
et al. (2002) provide an excellent analysis of the benefit take-up decision decoupled from the retirement 
decision.    18 
  Before  estimating  the  labor  supply  response  to  incremental  Social  Security 
benefits, we first present our estimates of Social Security Wealth and the corresponding 
intensive-margin and extensive-margin net-of-tax shares.  We do this for two reasons.  
First, the size and variation in the incentives implicit in the Social Security rules are of 
interest in and of themselves, because they inform how benefit rules could be restructured 
to reduce the size and variation of distortions.  Indeed, this is the focus of a number of 
papers in the literature.  See, for example, Feldstein and Samwick (1992), Butricia et al. 
(2006), Goda (2007), Sabelhaus (2007), and Goda, Shoven, and Slavov (2009).  Second, 
we want to document the variation in the incentives.  If the variation in the estimated 
incentives corresponds to what we would expect given the Social Security rules, we can 
be more confident that our calculated incentives are correct.
17 
  Figure 2 shows the distribution of Social Security Wealth in our sample, which 
consists of non-retired men and women between the ages of 52 and 80 and is not adjusted 
for family size.
18  Future benefits are discounted to the present using a 3% real discount 
rate.  Median Social Security Wealth is $269,000 while the Social Security Wealth of 90 
percent of our sample ranges between $0 and $360,578.  These values are in line with 
those found in the literature.
19 The second and third columns of Table 2 show the mean 
and  standard  deviation  of  Social  Security  Wealth  by  demographic  subgroup.    As 
expected,  Social  Security  Wealth  increases  with  work  history,  lifetime  earnings,  and 
education.  In addition, it is higher for married individuals than for widowed or single 
individuals. 
  Figure  3  shows  the  distribution  of  the  log  of  the  effective  Social  Security 
intensive-margin  net-of-tax  share  (INTS),  as  defined  by  equation  (5).    The  INTS 
                                                 
17 We also verified that our calculator of Social Security benefits yields the identical level of benefits as the 
ones provided by the on-line calculator of the Social Security Administration 
(www.ssa.gov/retire2/AnypiaApplet.html).  We performed this comparison on approximately 35 
hypothetical individuals or couples.  However, the Social Security Administration’s online calculator is 
limited to calculating the PIA (i.e., it does not predict lifetime benefits given expected lifespans).  In 
addition, it does not allow variation in the retirement date of spouses, which is precisely what yields some 
of the more complex scenarios when calculating PIAs and Social Security Wealth. 
18 We have no valid observations older than age 80.  All such individuals in the original cohort of the HRS 
were either retired in the first wave or were born prior to 1920, making them subject to different Social 
Security benefit rules. 
19 For example, Gustman et al. (1999) calculate median Social Security wealth in the HRS to be $145,000 
in 1992 dollars – equivalent to $200,000 in the 2003 dollars used in our paper.  We would expect Social 
Security wealth to continue to increase as the HRS cohort ages, so it is not surprising that our number is 
about 35 percent larger.   19 
measures the incentive effect of the effective Social Security tax on an additional dollar 
of earnings.  For those without any tax-benefit linkage (e.g. because they are sure to 
claim widow benefits), the effective Social Security tax is equal to the statutory tax rate 
of  10.6  percent,  and  the  log  of  their  net-of-tax  share  is  ln(1-0.106/1.053)=-0.106.  
Because additional earnings can never reduce expected Social Security benefits, this is 
also equal to the minimum of the log of the net-of-tax share.  The mean INTS is -0.037, 
which corresponds to a net marginal Social Security tax rate of 3.8%.  Thus, on average, 
the effective Social Security tax is 6.8 percentage points lower than the nominal tax due 
to the tax-benefit linkage.  However, the tax-benefit linkage varies tremendously and is 
highly right skewed.  Whereas 20 percent of person-years have virtually no tax-benefit 
linkage (INTS < -0.10), the tax-benefit is sufficiently strong for 18 percent of our sample 
that they face an effective Social Security subsidy (INTS > 0).  The latter group consists 
predominantly of married individuals whose spouses are highly likely to claim off of 
their record and who are relatively close to the retirement age (minimizing the extent to 
which future benefits are discounted).   
The fourth and fifth columns of Table 2 show the mean and standard deviation of 
INTS by demographic subgroup.  Work incentives are lower for women than for men 
because women are more likely to claim off of the records of their spouses.  Among men, 
work incentives are stronger for those with shorter work histories and lower lifetime 
earnings.  These effects are driven by the progressive nature of the Social Security benefit 
structure and the 35-year rule, giving those with lower earnings a stronger tax-benefit 
linkage.  Among women, we find that work incentives are much stronger if their earnings 
are high relative to their spouses’ earnings because this makes it much more likely that 
they  will  claim  based  on  their  own  record.    This  also  explains  why,  despite  the 
progressive nature of the benefit schedule, work incentives are generally relatively weak 
for women with short earnings histories or low lifetime earnings—there is no tax-benefit 
link if they claim on their spouses’ records. 
  Figure  4  shows  the  distribution  of  the  log  of  the  effective  Social  Security 
extensive-margin net-of-tax share (ENTS), as defined by equation (6).  The ENTS is a 
measure of the incentive effect of the effective net Social Security tax on the additional 
earnings if the person decides to retire next year rather than in the current year, where the   20 
additional earnings are predicted based on the person’s earnings in the previous wave.  
The ENTS, therefore, measures the net incentive from the Social Security system from 
postponing retirement by one year while keeping the date of claiming Social Security 
benefits constant.  Because additional earnings can never reduce expected Social Security 
benefits, the minimum value of ENTS is -0.106 and is reached for those whose effective 
Social  Security  tax  is  equal  to  the  statutory  rate.    This  occurs  for  33  percent  of  the 
sample.  These individuals may have no tax-benefit linkage for a variety of reasons.  For 
example, their current predicted indexed earnings might not be among their 35 highest 
annual indexed earnings, they might be sure to claim benefits on their spouse’s record, or 
they might not be vested. 
At the other extreme, 0.2 percent of observations have tax-benefit linkages that 
are so strong that their ENTS exceeds 0.5 (i.e., they receive an effective subsidy of about 
68%).  All of these cases occur because one additional year of earnings will give the 
individual sufficient quarters of earnings to qualify for receiving Social Security benefits.  
For example, we have one observation whose predicted earnings of $3,467 gives this 
individual  a  total  of  40  quarters  of  earnings,  thereby  qualifying  this  individual  for 
$112,308 in Social Security Wealth.  This translates into an effective subsidy of 3,239% 
percent on earnings, or an ENTS of 3.51.  While these incentives are most likely real, 
they are clearly outliers.
20  This produces a risk that the regressions will be driven by the 
handful of observations that qualify for Social Security because they reach the required 
number of quarters of earnings.  To  avoid this, we topcode ENTS at 0.50, which is 
slightly  above  the  highest  value  of  ENTS  achieved  by  someone  with  more  than  40 
quarters of earnings.  We will show below to what extent our estimates depend on this 
topcoding.  Even after topcoding, the distribution of ENTS remains right-skewed, and has 
a median of -0.060 and a mean of -0.054.  Ninety percent of observations in our sample 
have an ENTS that is negative and thus face a work disincentive.  Columns 6 and 7 of 
Table 2 show the mean and standard deviation of ENTS by demographic subgroup.  Even 
                                                 
20 Some individuals have very few quarters of Social Security earnings because they worked most of their 
years in a job not covered by Social Security (often state employees covered by state pension plans).  Anti-
double dipping laws force them to choose between their state pension and Social Security.  Thus, even 
when such individuals qualify for Social Security, in many cases they will choose the state pension (which 
is generally higher).  This means that their ENTS is, in effect, much lower when they reach the 40 quarters 
of Social Security earnings needed to qualify for Social Security.   21 
though the INTS and the ENTS are sometimes quite different for a given individual in a 
particular year, the overall variation in ENTS is similar to the variation in INTS when 
broken down by broad population subgroups as in Table 2. 
 
4.2 Illustrations of discontinuities-in-the-limit on incentives  
Figures 5 through 8 illustrate how provisions of the Social Security benefit rules, 
as  described  in  section  2.2,  create  discontinuities-in-the-limit  in  incentives  for  labor 
supply.  In other words, these provisions create non-linearities in marginal benefit rates 
that degenerate into discontinuities as uncertainty about future own and spousal labor 
supply is resolved. 
Figure 5 illustrates the discontinuity in the extensive-margin incentives (ENTS) 
created by the 35-year rule.  The dashed line plots the ENTS for a hypothetical single 
male who has the average lifetime earnings profile and started working at age 25.  We see 
a sudden and dramatic drop in his ENTS at age 60, the first year in which his earnings 
crowd out a year of positive earnings among his 35 highest annual earnings.  The solid 
line plots the ENTS for a second hypothetical person who is the same in all respects 
except that he started working at age 30.  For him, we find that the drop in the ENTS 
occurs at age 65, the first year when previous earnings start being crowded out by current 
earnings in the Social Security benefits formula.  These trajectories of the effective Social 
Security  tax  illustrate  the  type  of  discontinuities  that  help  identify  the  labor  supply 
responses to the effective Social Security tax. 
  Figure 6 shows that the incentives on the intensive margin for these same two 
hypothetical men exhibit no discontinuities.  No discontinuities occur on the intensive 
margin because the predicted earnings in the current year are sufficiently high so that 
they are among the 35 highest annual earnings.  In fact, the intensive-margin incentives 
are virtually identical for these two individuals.  Thus, a marginal increase in earnings 
will have the same effect on Social Security benefits regardless of whether the current 
year crowds out an earlier year with positive earnings or not.   
  The provision that allows one to choose between claiming benefits based on 100 
percent of own PIA or 50 percent of spousal PIA creates discontinuities-in-the-limit in 
both  the  intensive-margin  incentives  (INTS)  and  the  extensive-margin  incentives   22 
(ENTS).  Consider a hypothetical 63-year-old woman who started working at age 30 and 
whose earnings are equal to the mean earnings profile for women.  Her husband is 63 
years old, retired at age 62, started working at age 25, and in each year earned x percent 
of the mean earnings of males his age in that year.  The solid line in Figure 7 plots the 
INTS of this woman as a function of x, the fraction of age-specific male mean earnings 
that her husband earned.  We see three drops in the INTS, two of which are quite sudden.  
The first drop occurs around x equal to 0.2 and is associated with her husband’s PIA 
rising above 50 percent of her expected PIA, so that he chooses to claim benefits on his 
rather than her record, while she continues to claim benefits on her own record.  The 
second drop occurs more gradually between x equal to 0.7 and 1.7, because over this 
range it becomes increasingly likely that it will be beneficial for her to claim benefits on 
his record if she outlives him, and at the same time, that he will choose to claim benefits 
on his own record should he outlive her.  In other words, uncertainty about her future 
labor  supply  has  turned  the  discontinuity  associated  with  claiming  widow/widower 
benefits into a non-linearity. Finally, the third drop occurs at x equal to 2.2 percent, at 
which point she will most likely claim benefits on his record even when both of them are 
alive.    As  a  result,  her  tax-benefit  linkage  approaches  zero  and  her  effective  Social 
Security becomes equal to the statutory rate.
21  The short dashes plot the INTS for a 
woman who is the same in all respects, except that her husband died at age 63 after 
retiring at age 62.  Her INTS now only contains one region of rapid decline, starting 
around x equal to 0.7, where she switches from claiming on her own record to claiming 
on her spousal record.  The decline is only a discontinuity-in-the-limit because there is 
still uncertainty about her ultimate PIA due to  uncertainty about her retirement date.  
Finally, the long dashes  show the INTS for a hypothetical woman who is the same, 
except that she has always been single.  Figure 8 plots the extensive-margin incentives 
(ENTS) for the same three hypothetical women, and we observe a very similar pattern of 
drops in incentives, except that the non-linearities are true discontinuities. We observe 
true discontinuities in extensive-margin incentives because these incentives measure the 
                                                 
21 Because there is some possibility that this worker will take her own benefit before retiring (if she works 
long enough), her linkage rate never quite reaches zero, meaning her effective tax rate never quite reaches 
10.6 percent.  However, if she were a somewhat lower earner (e.g. if she had earned each year only 75 
percent of the mean earnings profile for women), she would never claim on her own record for sufficiently 
high values of x, and her tax-benefit linkage would reach zero.   23 
benefit  of  retirement  in  the  current  year  relative  to  retirement  in  the  next  year,  and 
therefore the women’s PIAs at the retirement dates considered are known.  Moreover, in 
this example, the husband was already retired or deceased, so his PIA was also non-
stochastic. 
 
4.3 Determination of the appropriate amount of flexibility in the control function 
To ensure that the identification of the effect of labor supply incentives from the 
Social Security rules is driven by variation due to the discontinuities-in-the-limit from the 
five provisions in the Social Security benefit rules, we need to select a control function 
f(Xi,t-1, γ) that is sufficiently flexible to absorb the remaining variation in the ENTS and 
INTS.  
  Table 3a provides a first indication of the amount of variation in the incentives 
that is not related to discontinuities-in-the-limit.  In this table, we report the R
2 and the 
root mean squared error (RMSE) of regressions of the smoothed ENTS and INTS on 
increasingly flexible sets of control variables.  Recall that the smoothed incentives are 
based  on  the  Social  Security  benefit  rules  stripped  of  those  provisions  that  create 
discontinuities-in-the-limit.  We therefore require a control function that is able to explain 
the vast majority of the variation in these smoothed incentives.  
Our baseline control function f(Xi,t-1, β) consists of a linear combination (with 
weights β) of 52 lags in the log of annual earnings and the same 52 earnings history 
variables for the individual’s spouse.
22  In addition, the linear combination contains a full 
set of dummies for own gender × age, for spousal gender × age, for the individual’s 
marital status (married, widowed, never married), for own and spousal education (high 
school dropout, high school graduate, some college, bachelor’s degree or more), for own 
and spousal race-ethnicity (non-Hispanic black, non-Hispanic white, Hispanic, other), for 
the retirement status of the individual’s spouse, and for the calendar year in which the 
observation takes place.  Further, the linear combination includes a cubic polynomial in 
log Social Security Wealth, a cubic polynomial in the log of the present discounted value 
                                                 
22 All earnings are topcoded at the Social Security maximum. Unless otherwise noted, we dummy out all 
the logs of dollar amounts for if the dollar amount is less than $1000 in 2003 dollars.  We do so for all 
variables in this paper that are logs of dollar amounts.   24 
of lifetime Social Security earnings, the log of the present discounted value of spousal 
lifetime Social Security earnings, the number of years the spouse has been retired (if 
retired), the age difference between the individual and the spouse, and a cubic polynomial 
in the number of years in which own Social Security earnings exceeded $1000, and the 
same cubic polynomial for the spouse.  In total, f(Xi,t-1, β) is a linear combination of 433 
non-collinear terms. 
The baseline vector of additional controls, Zit consists of the log of household 
assets, a cubic polynomial for job tenure at current job, for veteran status, for being born 
in the U.S., for longest industry of employment (13 dummies), for longest occupation (17 
dummies), and for the 10 Census regions.  In total, Zit consists of 48 terms.  We do not 
include the marginal labor supply incentives from private pensions as a control variable 
because this information is missing for a large fraction of respondents.  While this would 
potentially be a useful control variable, its effects are unlikely to be correlated with the 
discontinuities-in-the-limit that we use to identify our estimates.  Moreover, as Coile and 
Gruber  (2007)  show,  the  estimated  incentive  effects  from  Social  Security  are  very 
insensitive to the inclusion of pension incentive variables. 
The first row of Table 3a shows the raw variation in the smoothed ENTS and 
INTS in the samples that will be used to run the labor supply regressions.  In the sample 
for  the  retirement  regressions,  the  standard  deviation  of  the  smoothed  ENTS  is  4.55 
percentage points, while the standard deviation for the smoothed INTS is 3.75 percentage 
points in the sample for the hours regressions and 3.86 percentage points in the sample 
for the earnings regressions. The fifth row of Table 3a shows that the baseline controls 
explain  about  95  percent  of  the  variation  in  the  smoothed  incentives  and  reduce  the 
RMSE of the incentives to about 0.9 to 1.1 percentage points.  Rows 2 to 4 show which 
components  of  the  baseline  control  variables  contribute  the  most  to  explaining  the 
smoothed  incentives.    (Appendix  Table  2  contains  exact  definitions  of  the  control 
variables  in  each  row.)    Basic  demographics  only  explain  about  25-35%,  and  unless 
either income history or higher-order terms are included, the R
2 does not rise above about 
80%. Row 6 adds an additional 163 interaction and higher-order terms to the baseline 
regression, which increases the explanatory power to about 97 percent.  Row 7 shows that   25 
adding a further 320 interaction and higher-order terms to the specification from row 6 
only produces a very slight increase in explanatory power.  
  Table 3b runs the same set of regressions on the true incentives, which include 
variation due to the various discontinuities-in-the-limit.  As expected, the RMSE is higher 
for  the  true  incentives  than  the  smoothed  ones  because  of  this  additional  variation.  
Conversely, the R
2 is lower in all specifications.  The baseline set of controls is only able 
to explain about 58 percent of the variation in the extensive-margin incentives and about 
68 percent of the variation in the intensive-margin incentives.  Adding further interaction 
and higher-order terms can increase the explanatory power somewhat, but even in row 7, 
about 36 percent of the variation in the ENTS and about 26 percent of the variation in the 
INTS can not be explained.  We conclude that this unexplained variation is primarily due 
to the discontinuities-in-the limit resulting from the five provisions in the Social Security 
benefit rules we described earlier.  Overall, Tables 3a and 3b indicate that the baseline set 
of controls eliminates almost all variation in incentives that cannot be due to these five 
provisions but still leaves sufficient variation in the true incentives.  The specifications of 
rows  6  and  7  are  more  conservative  because  they  increase  the  fraction  of  unwanted 
variation absorbed from about 93% to almost 99%, but they do this at the cost of possibly 
also absorbing some of the valid variation, namely non-linearities caused by the five 
provisions that have not yet converged to discontinuities.  
  Table  4  tests  whether  the  control  function  passes  our  criterion  of  absorbing 
sufficient  variation  to  render  all  estimates  on  the  smoothed  incentive  variables 
insignificant.  In this table, we show regressions of a measure of labor supply (retirement, 
hours, or earnings) on the smoothed incentive measure and on various specifications of 
the control function.  We find that the baseline control function (in row 5), as well as the 
more extensive ones (rows 6 and 7), pass the criterion – none of the estimated incentive 
effects  are  significant.    Less  flexible  control  functions  (rows  2-4)  do  not  pass  the 
criterion,  since  they  do  not  absorb  enough  variation  to  make  the  estimated  incentive 
effects insignificant. 
 
4.4 Labor Supply Estimates based on the Discontinuity-in-the-Limit Approach   26 
  Table  5  presents  our  baseline  estimates  of  the  incentive  effects  of  the  Social 
Security benefit rules on labor supply.  The incentives are measured by the extensive-
margin or intensive-margin net-of-tax shares (ENTS or INTS), and we have established 
that, after inclusion of our baseline controls, the primary source of identifying variation in 
these incentives are discontinuities-in-the-limit that arise from the 5 provisions in the 
Social Security benefit rules described in section 2.2.  Since these discontinuities-in-the-
limit are driven by specific quirks in the benefit rules, we consider it highly unlikely that 
there could be omitted variables that are correlated with both these discontinuities-in-the-
limit and with labor supply.  We therefore regard our estimates as plausibly causal. 
  The first row of Table 5 regresses a retirement dummy on the log of the expected 
effective Social Security extensive-margin net-of-tax share (ENTS) as well as the 433 
baseline control variables.  The first column shows the estimates for the full sample, 
while the next two columns separate the estimates by gender.  For the full sample, we 
find that a higher net-of-tax share has a statistically significant negative effect on the 
retirement probability.  In particular, an increase in the net-of-tax share of 0.10 (about 
two standard deviations) reduces the two-year retirement hazard by about 2.1 percentage 
points on a base of 15.1, or by about 14 percent.  Thus, the effect is not only statistically 
significant  but  also  economically  meaningful.   The  next  two  columns  show  that  this 
estimate appears to be driven by the subsample of women.  For men, we do not find a 
significant effect of ENTS, but the confidence interval is sufficiently wide that we cannot 
rule out that the retirement response for men is as large as the point estimate for the 
whole sample.  The hypothesis that men and women react differently to the extensive-
margin incentives can be rejected only at a marginal level of significance (p-value: 0.08).  
  The  second  and  third  rows  of  the  table  show  the  responses  on  the  intensive 
margin.  In the second row, we use the log of usual weekly hours as the dependent 
variable, while the dependent variable in the third row is the log of annual earnings.  
Since the expected effective Social Security intensive-margin net-of-tax share (INTS) is 
also measured in logs, the estimates can all be interpreted as labor supply elasticities.  As 
we are interested in measuring labor supply responses along the intensive margin, we 
require that the respondents be in the labor market to be included in the regression.  We 
therefore impose a requirement of at least 15 hours of labor supply per week in the hours   27 
regression or annual earnings of at least $2500 in the earnings regression.  We estimate a 
statistically significant labor supply elasticity of 0.41 in whole sample when labor supply 
is measured by hours.  As columns 2 and 3 show, this estimate is driven by the subsample 
of men, though the confidence interval on the estimate for women is sufficiently wide 
that our estimate can only rule out female labor supply elasticities larger than 0.27.  We 
reject the hypothesis that the hours elasticity is the same for men and women.  When we 
measure  labor  supply  by  annual  earnings,  we  do  not  find  statistically  significant 
elasticities.    The  point  estimate  for  the  whole  sample,  0.10,  is  positive  and  the 
corresponding 95%-confidence interval, -0.34 to +0.53, is consistent with our estimate 
for the hours elasticity.   
  Overall, we believe Table 5 provides reasonably compelling evidence that there is 
at least some effect of incentives from the Social Security benefit rules on labor supply.  
All the estimates in Table 5 are consistent with at least small incentive effects in the 
expected direction, while in four of the nine specifications we can reject the hypothesis of 
no incentive effects at the five percent level or better.  It is important to keep in mind that 
our estimates are driven by responses to five discontinuities in the Social Security rules.  
If these discontinuities are particularly salient, then the behavioral response that we find 
could be greater than the behavioral response to benefit rules more generally.  Moreover, 
our  estimates  are  local  treatment  effects  since  they  represent  the  responses  of  those 
individuals who are close to one or more of the discontinuities.  It is possible that these 
individuals respond differently to labor supply incentives than the general population.  
One  therefore  needs  to  be  careful  before  applying  our  estimates  of  the  behavioral 
response to labor supply incentives to other settings. 
While  we  can  reject  the  hypothesis  that  the  link  between  earnings  and  future 
Social Security benefits is completely ignored in people’s labor supply decisions, our 
results provide very limited guidance as to how much of this link is perceived on average.  
To quantify the extent to which this link is perceived, we need to compare our estimated 
elasticities to labor elasticities from the literature that apply to the same population and 
that are identified off of incentive changes that are fully perceived.  While we know of no 
estimates that satisfy these criteria exactly, labor supply elasticities are often estimated to 
be around 0.1 to 0.4 (Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999; Gruber and Saez, 2002; Kopczuk,   28 
2005).  Given this range and the confidence intervals on our estimates, our estimates are 
consistent both with a full perception of the tax-benefit link and with a very limited 
perception of this link. 
 
4.5  Robustness 
  Table 6 examines the sensitivity of our baseline estimates to the specification of 
the control variables.  Row 5 reproduces the baseline estimates.  Rows 1 to 4 show 
regressions with less extensive specifications of the control function, and as a result these 
estimates may be driven by variation in the incentives not due to the five provisions of 
the Social Security rules that generate discontinuities-in-the-limit.  Indeed, we find some 
instances  where  we  estimate  statistically  significant  incentive  effects  in  the  wrong 
direction (such as the earnings regression in row 2), which indicates that some variation 
unrelated  to  the  discontinuities-in-the-limit  is  indeed  correlated  with  unobserved 
determinants of labor supply. 
  Rows 6 and 7 show that the baseline estimates are reasonably robust to making 
the control function substantially more flexible (the number of control variables almost 
doubles from the baseline specification to the specification in row 7).  The estimates for 
the  retirement  regressions  are  extremely  robust  to  making  the  control  function  more 
flexible.    This  is  not  surprising  since  estimates  based  on  true  discontinuities  are  not 
sensitive to the specification of the control function (as long as it is continuous) and the 
sharpest  discontinuities  occur  in  the  extensive-margin  incentives  because  for  these 
incentives there is no uncertainty about future own labor supply.  The hours elasticity for 
the whole sample remains statistically significant in row 6 but becomes only marginally 
statistically significant 7.  The hours elasticity for men, however, retains it statistical 
significance  in  both  rows.    The  finding  that  the  hours  elasticity  is  somewhat  more 
sensitive  to  the  control  function  may  be  due  to  the  fact  that  a  very  flexible  control 
function will also absorb some of the non-linearities in incentives that have not fully 
converged to discontinuities. 
  Table 7 presents a further set of robustness tests.  Panels A, B, and C show the 
robustness checks to the retirement regression, the hours regression, and the earnings 
regression, respectively.  The first row of each panel reproduces the baseline regression.    29 
The second row shows that results are very robust to including the smoothed incentives 
as a control variable, which provides further confirmation that the estimates are driven by 
the  discontinuities-in-the-limit.    In  rows  3  and  4,  we  use  alternative  retirement 
definitions, based exclusively on earnings (row 3) or exclusively on self-reports (row 4) 
rather than our baseline definition, which combines information from both sources.  We 
find that the results are fairly robust to the choice of the retirement definition.  In the 
Retirement  regressions,  we  can  reject  the  null  hypothesis  of  zero  extensive-margin 
reaction at least at the 10 percent level in the case of all 3 retirement definitions.  With 
the hours regressions, we can reject the null hypothesis at the 5 percent level in the case 
of two of the three measures of retirement.  In the case of the earnings regressions, none 
of the retirement definitions produce statistically significant results.  The remaining rows 
of panel A show that the results for the retirement regressions remain similar when we 
use a Probit rather than a linear probability model and are robust to how we treat the right 
tail of the log of the extensive-margin net-of-tax share (no topcoding at all in row 6, or in 
row 7, topcoding them at 0.10 rather than 0.50).  Rows 5 and 6 of panel B show that the 
hours  regressions  are  reasonably  robust  to  the  specification  of  the  hours  cut-off  for 
inclusion in the sample. Finally, row 7 of panel B shows that the 1.2% of observations in 
which the log of the intensive-margin net-of-tax share exceeds 0.10 (i.e., where the Social 
Security rules provide an implicit subsidy of 10% or more), contribute importantly to the 
magnitude  of  the  baseline  estimate  of  the  hours  regression  for  the  whole  sample.  
Topcoding the INTS for these observations at 0.10 decreases the point estimate by almost 
half and, as a result, this estimate is no longer statistically significant.  The estimate in the 
subsample of men, however, remains significant at the 1 percent level. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Estimating how the effective marginal Social Security tax affects labor supply is 
challenging,  as  the  effective  tax  rate  is  a  complicated  function  of  own  and  spousal 
characteristics (including earnings histories), which may be correlated with unobserved 
determinants of labor supply.  In this paper, we overcome this challenge by exploiting 
five provisions in the Social Security benefit rules that create discontinuities or non-
linearities that converge to discontinuities as uncertainty about the future is resolved.  We   30 
develop a methodology to ensure that only this credible source of variation is being used 
to identify the labor supply response to the effective Social Security tax rate.   
Our  estimates  conclusively  reject  the  notion  that  labor  supply  is  completely 
unresponsive to the incentives generated by the Social Security benefit rules.  We find 
reasonably robust and statistically significant evidence that individuals are more likely to 
retire  when  the  effective  marginal  Social  Security  tax  is  high.    We  also  find  some 
evidence  that  incentives  from  the  Social  Security  rules  affect  labor  supply  along  the 
intensive margin, but this evidence is less robust.  A prominent argument has been that 
workers  fail  to  perceive  the  link  between  incremental  Social  Security  taxes  paid  and 
incremental benefits received.  Our estimates contradict that argument and suggest that 
the potential efficiency gains from increasing the transparency of the link between Social 
Security benefits and taxes may be smaller than is generally assumed. 
Our finding that individuals react at least to some extent to the variation in Social 
Security  incentives  raises  interesting  questions  about  the  mechanism.    Given  the 
complexity of the Social Security benefit rules, how is it that workers are able to perceive 
and respond to the Social Security incentives?  If, as Gustman and Steinmeier (2005b) 
show, individuals are poorly informed about the level of their Social Security benefits, is 
it  plausible  they  understand  the  incentive  effects?    Are  the  discontinuities  we  study 
salient enough that a large fraction of the population actually understands them?  Is there 
a way for individuals to learn optimal behavior from other, more informed, individuals 
without understanding the rules themselves? Chan and Stevens (2008) have answered 
some of these questions in the context of private pension incentives.  They find that only 
a minority of older workers is well-informed about their retirement incentives and that 
this minority drives the estimated effects of pension incentives on retirement.  To begin 
answering some of these questions in the context of Social Security, two of us have 
started a separate project in which we are surveying older workers and recent retirees 
about their understanding of Social Security rules and incentives.    31 
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Appendix 1: Variable Definitions 
This appendix contains definitions for the variables used in our regressions, except for 
those variables of which the definition is obvious (such as age or sex). Unless otherwise 
specified, all dollar amounts are in 2003 dollars. 
 
Dependent Variables 
retired  —  Dummy  for  whether  respondent  retired  within  the  previous  year.    Our 
definition of retirement is explained in more detail at the end of this appendix. 
hours — Self-reported usual hours worked per week on primary and second job. 
earnings — Annual earnings in the year of observation. 
 
Independent Variables 
earningsh — Log of indexed Social Security-eligible earnings h years prior to the year of 
observation, where h takes values 1 through 52.  The final year of observations 
occurs in 2003, and the first year for which SS income is available is 1951.  For 
observations prior to 2003, all values corresponding to years prior to 1951 are set 
to  zero.  The  underlying  earnings  have  a  range  of  zero  to  the  indexed  Social 
Security maximum in the applicable year.  
 
spousal earningsh — Log of spousal indexed Social Security-eligible earnings h years 
prior to the year of observation.  In the case where the respondent is not married 
spousal earningsh is equal to zero. 
 
assets — Log of total family assets, where total family assets is a value taken directly 
from the RAND version of the HRS.   
 
lifetime earnings — Log of the PDV of total SS-eligible earnings since 1951 (excluding 
the year of observation).  This is calculated by taking the log of the sum of the 
PDVs of each prior year’s SS-eligible earnings.  The PDV of a year’s SS-eligible 
earnings calculated using 3% real interest rate.   
 
marital status dummies — These consist of three dummies for the marital status of the 
respondent:  married,  widowed,  and  never  married  (divorced  individuals  are 
excluded from our sample). 
 
wave dummies — Set of 7 dummy variables indicating the wave of the HRS from which 
the observation was taken. 
 
education dummies — Set of 4 dummy variables for the educational attainment of the 
respondent:  high  school  dropout,  high  school  graduate,  some  college,  and  a 
college degree. 
 
region dummies — Set of 10 dummies for the US Census regions of residence  
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race dummies — Set of 4 dummies for race/ethnicity of respondent: non-Hispanic white, 
non-Hispanic black, Hispanic, and other. 
 
occupation dummies — Set of 17 dummies for the longest occupation of the respondent 
and  an  eighteenth  dummy  corresponding  to  missing.    The  17  occupations  are 
available in the RAND HRS Data Documentation, Version F, page 969.  The 
dummy variables are generated from the RAND version of the HRS variables 
R1JLOCC,  R2JLOCC,  R3JLOCC,  R4JLOCC,  R5JLOCC,  R6JLOCC,  and 
R7JLOCC. 
 
industry dummies — Set of 13 dummies for the industry in which the respondent has 
been employed the longest and a fourteenth dummy corresponding to missing.  
The 13 industries are available in the RAND HRS Data Documentation, Version 
F, page 974.  The dummy variables are generated from the RAND version of the 
HRS variables R1JLIND, R2JLIND, R3JLIND, R4JLIND, R5JLIND, R6JLIND, 
and R7JLIND. 
 
number of years worked in total — Number of years in which respondent had indexed 
Social Security-eligible earnings greater than $1000. 
 
veteran status— Dummy for respondent’s veteran status.  Set to zero if unknown. 
 
born in the USA — Dummy for whether respondent was born in the United States.  Set to 
zero if unknown. 
 
current job tenure—Number of years respondent has been at current job.  Set to zero if 
unknown. 
 
 
Defining Retirement 
 
Baseline Definition 
  The  baseline  definition  is  based  on  both  self-reported  retirement  status  and 
reported earnings.  In order to be considered retired, a person must report earnings below 
a certain threshold and report being retired. 
  First, a person’s earnings must be and remain below $2,500 according to the SSA-
provided  earnings  data  through  1990  and  the  self-reported,  bi-annual  earnings  data 
respondents provide to the HRS thereafter.  Respondents are asked in each bi-annual 
wave  (even  years  from  1992-2004)  what  their  earnings  were  in  the  preceding  year 
(corresponding to odd years from 1991-2003).  The specifics of this question and the raw 
variables  in  the  RAND  version  of  the  HRS,  R1IEARN,  R2IEARN,  R3IEARN, 
R4IEARN, R5IEARN, R6IEARN, and R7IEARN are available in the RAND HRS Data 
Documentation, Version F, page 612.  In addition, our analysis uses SSA administrative 
earnings data from 1951 through 1990. 
Second,  a  person  must  report  being  retired  using  the  self-reported  retirement 
status  RAND  version  HRS  variables,  R1SAYRET,  R2SAYRET,  R3SAYRET,   37 
R4SAYRET,  R5SAYRET,  R6SAYRET,  and  R7SAYRET,  information  on  which  is 
available in the RAND HRS Data Documentation, Version F, page 847.  Respondents 
must call themselves “fully retired” to be considered retired, not “partially retired.”  Note 
that in some cases, after a respondent calls himself fully retired, he is not asked whether 
he is retired in subsequent waves.  In this case, the individual’s “missing” response is 
considered to be the same as “fully retired.”  A respondent who reports being fully retired 
but in later waves changes his status to partially retired or not retired is not considered to 
have been retired. 
Since the self-reported retirement status variables cover a two-year span, we use 
the variables R1RETYR, R2RETYR, R3RETYR, R4RETYR, R5RETYR, R6RETYR, 
and  R7RETYR,  which  indicate  the  self-reported  year  of  retirement,  to  determine  the 
precise year that a respondent began considering himself retired.  Information on these 
variables is available in the RAND HRS Data Documentation, Version F, page 853.  In 
cases  where  these  are  missing,  the  year  immediately  before  the  survey took  place  is 
counted as the year of retirement.  (This corresponds to the midpoint of the previous 
survey and the current survey.) 
Thus, individuals who either report non-retirement or earnings of at least $2,500 
in the first wave are considered retired in the year that their income falls below $2,500 
and  they  report  their  retirement  status  as  “fully  retired”  (assuming  there  is  no  later 
deviation from either status).  Individuals who report being fully retired and with income 
below $2,500 in the first wave (and who never change their retirement status nor report 
income of over $2,500) are considered to be retired in the first year in which their income 
fell below $2,500 according to SSA records. 
Individuals who never have income above $2,500 in either the self-reported HRS 
or the SSA-provided data are excluded from the analysis. 
 
Earnings-Based Retirement Definition 
  The  earnings-based  retirement  definition  relies  on  the  same  earnings  criterion 
used to determine retirement in the baseline retirement definition. 
  In this method, an individual is considered to be retired if his yearly earnings fall 
below  $2500  and  remain  at  that  level  in  all  subsequent  observations.    (In  addition, 
earnings must have been at or above $2500 at some point; otherwise, the individual is 
considered never to have been in the labor force and thus never to have retired.) 
  The year of retirement is considered to be the midpoint between the last reported 
year of earnings greater than or equal to $2500 and the first year earnings permanently 
fell below $2500.  If this average falls “between” two years, the later year is used. 
 
Self-Reported Retirement Definition 
  The  self-reported  retirement  methodology  uses  self-reports  to  determine 
retirement.  It is based closely on the methodology of Coile and Gruber (2007). 
  There are 21 variables that are used to determine retirement—the 14 from the 
baseline  definition  describing  self-reported  retirement  status  and  self-reported  year  of 
retirement, and seven more describing self-reported labor force status.  In the RAND 
version  of  the  HRS,  these  variables  are  R1LBRF,  R2LBRF,  R3LBRF,  R4LBRF, 
R5LBRF, R6LBRF, and R7LBRF.  Information on these variables is in the RAND HRS 
Data Documentation, Version F, page 911.   38 
  An individual is considered retired if his self-reported labor force status is either 
“retired” or “partially retired” unless his self-reported retirement status is “not retired at 
all.”   
  As in the baseline case, since the self-reported retirement variables cover two-year 
periods, the precise year of retirement is then determined by the self-reported date of 
retirement.   In  cases  where  this  is  missing,  the  year  before  the  survey  took  place  is 
counted as the year of retirement.  (This corresponds to the midpoint of the previous 
survey and the current survey.) 
  Consistent with the retirement definition of Coile and Gruber, once an individual 
is determined to be retired, no future information—including evidence of future labor 
force re-entry—is considered. 
 
 
 
   39 
Appendix 2: Calculation of Expected Social Security Wealth 
The following is a detailed description of the methodology we use to calculate 
family Social Security Wealth, which is then used to calculate the intensive-margin net-
of-tax share (INTS) and the extensive-margin net-of-tax share (ENTS). 
 
Social Security Wealth 
  Our calculation of Social Security Wealth proceeds in three broad sections.  First, 
the program calculates prospective Primary Insurance Amounts (PIA) based on actual 
earnings  histories  and  potential  future  earnings.    Second,  the  program  calculates 
probabilities  of  various  future  earnings  scenarios.    Finally,  given  the  PIAs  and 
probabilities  previously  determined,  the  program  calculates  expected  Social  Security 
benefits. 
 
Calculating PIAs 
The program first calculates, for each respondent and given his work history, a 
separate PIA based on each possible retirement date.  Furthermore, it calculates a Death 
Primary Insurance Amount (DPIA)
23 for each possible retirement date and year of death. 
It then does the same for the spouse, if applicable.  The program assumes that retirement 
occurs at some point between the current age and age 80,
24 and so separate PIAs based on 
each possible date of retirement are considered.  We assume retirement is irreversible. 
Let yi,t-1 ={…, yi,t-2, yi,t-1} denote the vector of the individual’s indexed earnings 
up to and including year t-1.  Only earnings up to the Social Security taxable maximum 
are  included  and  these  are  indexed  for  economy-wide  wage  growth  up  to  age  60.  
(Earnings after age 60 are not indexed.) Let the vector y
+(yi,t-1, i, t, c) denote predicted 
future  indexed  earnings  if  the  respondent  remains  in  the  labor  force.  Specifically,  y
+ 
consists of c elements corresponding to indexed earnings in year t and in future years 
until,  but  not  including,  year  c.    Elements  of  y
+  are  calculated  by  increasing  the 
individual’s  earnings  in  year  t-1  by  the  age-  and  gender-specific  wage  growth  rates.  
These  wage  growth  rates  are  estimated  from  within  the  HRS,  by  age  and  sex,  for 
individuals who remain within the labor force.  In addition, we index these predicted 
earnings  according  to  Social  Security  rules  and  assumptions  about  wage  growth  and 
inflation.  Thus, the vector function y
+ depends on yi,t-1 because yi,t-1 is used as a baseline 
to predict future earnings.  It depends on i because the amount of indexing on a given 
year’s wage is dependent on the year of birth of the earner and because the wage growth 
rates are age- and gender-specific.  Finally, y
+ depends on t, the year of observation, 
because  years  prior  to  t  have  already  occurred  and  therefore  do  not  appear  in  the 
prediction of future earnings.   
Let PIA(yi,t-1, y
+(yi,t-1, i, t, min(n, j)), B(i)) be the PIA in year n of individual i who 
retires in year j, where B(i) denotes the birth date of individual i.  The PIA is a function of 
the individual’s earnings profile up to the earlier of either the year to which the PIA 
applies  (year  n)  or  the  year  in  which  the  earnings  ended  due  to  retirement  (year  j).  
Specifically, the earnings profile is used to calculate the individual’s AIME, or Average 
Indexed  Monthly  Earnings.    For  individuals  born  in  1928  or  later,  the  AIME  is  the 
                                                 
23 PIA refers to the Life Primary Insurance Amount of a worker.  There is a separate Death Primary 
Insurance Amount (DPIA) that is bequeathed to one’s spouse. 
24 PIAs are also calculated for cases in which an individual dies not yet having retired.   40 
average of the 35 highest years of indexed earnings.  According to the Social Security 
vesting rule, the AIME is set to zero if the individual has too few years of earnings, as 
defined by the Social Security Administration.
25 The AIME is then converted to a PIA 
based on a progressive schedule.  This schedule does not vary over time, but there is a 
separate schedule for each cohort as defined by year of birth, which explains why the PIA 
is a function of B(i).  Finally, the nominal PIA is indexed for inflation for every year past 
age 62.
26  For tractability, let Pitnj = (yi,t-1, y
+(yi,t-1, i, t, min(n, j)), B(i)) 
  We denote the spousal analogues of these variable by a superscript S.  Thus, let 
the spouse’s PIA by denoted by P itnk
S  = PIA(yi,t 1
S , y
+(yi,t 1
S , i, t, min(n, k)), B
S(i)), where k 
denotes the year in which the spouse retired.  Thus,  P itnk
S  is the living spouse PIA for 
which  an  individual  is  eligible  based  on  his  living  spouse’s  record.    Note  that  this 
function is the same function used to calculate Pitnj above, but with different inputs—
those of the spouse. 
Finally, let  DP itnkm
S = DPIA(yit
S , y
+(yit
S , i, t, min(n, k, m)), m, B
S(i), B(i)).  DPIA is 
the PIA that an individual’s spouse bequeaths to the individual upon the spouse’s death in 
year m.  For a spouse who dies over the age of 62, it is the exact same as the regular PIA.  
However, special rules exist in the cases of spouses who die younger than 62. In that 
case, the death PIA is based on fewer than 35  years of earnings  and is subject to a 
different indexing scheme. Because of these special rules, DPIA depends on the year of 
spousal death, m.  These rules also vary slightly based on the age of the surviving spouse, 
and thus the birth year of the individual, B(i), is relevant as well. 
   
Calculating Probabilities 
Next,  the  program  calculates  the  probability  that  each  death  and  retirement 
combination takes place for each individual.  The probabilities of retirement are the ones 
we observe within the HRS, by age and sex.  The probabilities of death are based on 
cohort  life  tables  released  by  the  Social  Security  Administration,  by  sex  and  date  of 
birth.
27    We  modify  these  death  probabilities  to  account  for  race  and  educational 
attainment using the method described in Brown et al. (2002). 
Let ditl be the probability the individual i dies in period l conditional on being 
alive in year t. The spousal analogue of this probability is  ditm
S , where m, as before, 
defines  the  year  of  spousal  death.  Let  ritjl  denote  the  probability  that  individual  i’s 
earnings ended in year j as a result of voluntary retirement, conditional on not having yet 
retired at the beginning of year t and conditional on death in year l.
28 Let uitl denote the 
                                                 
25 The minimum number of significant years of earnings is generally 10, or 40 quarters.  An individual can 
earns up to 4 quarters per year, and the threshold for earning a “quarter” is quite low; it is $1,090 in 2009.  
Rules regarding the effect of disability on one’s PIA are ignored in our paper, as all individuals who report 
disability are excluded from our analysis. 
26 Note that inflation affects the real value of the PIA in two ways.  First, neither the earnings input to the 
PIA nor the PIA itself is indexed for inflation from age 60 to age 62, and thus those two years of inflation 
erode the real value of the PIA.  Second, unindexed (nominal) earnings after the age of 62 are input to the 
AIME (if they are in the top 35 years), which is then converted to a PIA, which is then, in turn, indexed for 
inflation from the age of 62. 
27 We assume that one dies immediately upon turning 100, although the SSA cohort life tables do not 
assume this until age 120. 
28 This means that the last year with positive earnings was in year t-1.   41 
probability that individual i’s earnings ended in year l as a result of death conditional on 
not having retired at the beginning of year t and conditional on death in year l. 
For all values of j l   , we assume ritjl is uncorrelated with the year of death, l. The 
probability from a situation whereby one both retires and dies in the same year accrues to 
ritjl, as retirement clearly happened first, and death was thus not the direct cause of the 
end of the earnings.  Thus, uitl excludes the scenario whereby a person retires voluntarily 
and then dies the same year and uitl only captures the probability that one’s earnings end 
in l and that one also dies in year l, having never retired.
29  In effect, uitl captures the sum 
of the retirement probabilities that would have existed into the future if death had not 
occurred in year l.  Given these definitions, ritjl, uitl, ditl are related as follows: 
1 ,
l
itjl itl
j t
r u l t
=
   
= +        
      , 
 
1
l
itl itjl itl
l t j t
d r u
 
= =
           
= +            
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The spousal analogues of the above are 
S
itkm r  and 
S
itm u . 
 
Calculating Benefits 
Finally, the program calculates the stream of benefits for a couple given each 
possible state of the world (i.e., each combination of a respondent’s and spouse’s dates of 
retirement and death), calculates the PDV of each using a 3% real discount rate, and 
weights each stream’s PDV by the appropriate probabilities described above.
  
An individual whose spouse is alive has a choice of receiving benefits based on 
his or her own PIA or based on 50% of his or her spouse’s PIA.  Moreover, an individual 
who is a widow can claim benefits based on the maximum of his or her own PIA and his 
or her spouse’s DPIA. 
An individual’s Social Security benefits are adjusted based on his or her date of 
birth and age at which he or she started claiming benefits. In case of spousal or widow 
benefits, benefits also depend on the individual’s spouse’s date of birth, age of  benefit 
claiming (if the spouse ever claimed before dying), and age of death.  We assume that 
individuals start claiming benefits at the the greater of the year in which they turn 62 (the 
Early Retirement Age, ERA) and year j, their year of retirement, but that no individual 
postpones claiming benefits beyond the year in which they turn 70.  Let Ainjl be the 
benefit adjustment factor in year n for individual i taking benefits based on his or her own 
earnings, given a birth date of B(i), a retirement date of j, and a death date of l.  This 
factor is zero in years before the early retirement age is reached and after death, meaning 
no benefits are received.  Note that these four inputs, n, B(i), j, and l, fully define the age 
                                                 
29 Under certain circumstances, if a person does voluntarily retire (and take up Social Security benefits) and 
then die in the same year, the PIA bequeathed to that person’s spouse is different from if the person had 
simply died.     42 
of take-up, whether take-up ever occurs, and the adjustment factor. Ainjl is equal to zero if 
take-up has not yet occurred or if n is greater than or equal to l.  The actual benefits 
received,  if  the  person  claims  benefits  on  his  or  her  own  record,  are  equal  to  the 
adjustment factor times the PIA.  Ainjl takes into account the delayed retirement credit and 
“early retirement penalty.”
30  The delayed retirement credit increases benefits by several 
percent for each year claiming is delayed beyond the Full Retirement Age (FRA), and the 
early retirement penalty decreases benefits by several percent (the exact percentage of 
each varies by cohort) for every year take-up occurs before the FRA.
31 
Let SAinjlm be the adjustment factor in year n for an individual taking spousal 
benefits (benefits based on a living spouse’s earnings).  This is function of everything of 
which A is a function, as well as of i’s spouse’s date of birth, B
S(i), and of i’s spouse’s 
date of death, m.  SA is zero if any of the following are true in n: i’s spouse has not 
reached the ERA (n < 62 + B
S(i)), i has not taken up benefits (n < min{j, 70 + B(i)}), i 
has died (n ≥ l), or i’s spouse has died (n ≥ m).
32  The actual benefits received are equal to 
the adjustment factor times half of the spouse’s PIA. 
Let WAinjklm be the adjustment factor in year n for someone taking widow benefits 
(benefits based on his or her deceased spouse’s benefits).  This is a function of everything 
of which SA is a function, as well as of i’s spouse’s retirement date, k.  WA is zero if any 
of the following are true in t: i’s spouse is still alive, i has not yet taken up benefits, or i 
has died. 
Given  everything  above,  the  expected  own  Social  Security  benefit  in  year  n 
(where n ≥ t) is found by taking the expectation of maximum benefits in that year over all 
possible combinations of the own and spousal labor exit date and own and spousal date of 
death.  It is also necessary to differentiate between the two possible reasons for exiting 
the labor force, voluntary retirement and death.  Because there are two possibilities for 
each person in the couple, there are four possible “retirement combinations,” each of 
which contributes to the expected Social Security benefit in a given year.  Conditional on 
information known in year t (including earnings histories upto year t-1), and letting j 
index year of own retirement, k index year of spousal retirement, l index year of own 
death, and m index year of spousal death, the portion of benefits in year n due to both 
individuals’ voluntarily retiring is 
     
E SSBitn
r,sr |yi,t 1,yi,t 1
S        , which is calculated as: 
     
Et SSBitn
r,sr |yi,t 1,yi,t 1
S         = ditl
m=k
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  ditm
S ritjlritkm
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1
2 P itnk
S { }+1(m   n)max Ainjl   P itnj,WAinjklm   DP itnkm
S { }  
 
 
  , 
 
                                                 
30 The term “delayed retirement credit” is official Social Security terminology, while the analogous “early 
retirement penalty” is not an official term.  In fact, both the credit and penalty refer to take-up of Social 
Security benefits, not to retirement itself. 
31 In earlier cohorts the size of the delayed retirement is smaller than the early retirement penalty.  For 
younger cohorts, however, the delayed retirement credit is larger in magnitude than the early retirement 
penalty, creating, interestingly, strong incentives to retire at any time other than the FRA. 
32 In the last case, where i’s spouse has died, SA equals zero because i is eligible for widow benefits, not 
benefits off of a living spouse’s record.   43 
where 1(.) denotes the indicator function (which equals one if the expression between 
parentheses is true and zero otherwise). 
The portion of benefits in year n due to voluntary retirement on the individual’s 
part  but  labor  force  exit  due  to  death  for  the  individual’s  spouse 
is
     
Et SSBitn
r,su |yi,t 1,yi,t 1
S        .    Continuing  to  allow  j,  l,  and  m  to  index  year  of  own 
retirement, year of own death, and year of spousal death, respectively; and setting k equal 
to  , which previously indexed year of spousal voluntary retirement, this is: 
     
Et SSBitn
r,su |yi,t 1,yi,t 1
S         = ditl
m=t
 
 
l= j
 
 
j=t
 
  ditm
S ritjluitm
S   
    
   
1(m > n)max Ainjl   P itnj,SAinjlm  
1
2 P itnk
S { }+1(m   n)max Ainjl   P itnj,WAinjklm   DP itnkm
S { }  
 
 
  . 
 
The portion of benefits in n due to voluntary spousal retirement but labor force exit due to 
death on the individual’s part is 
     
Et SSBitn
u,sr |yit,yit
S        .  Calculating this sets j, year of own 
retirement, to  , which yields: 
     
Et SSBitn
u,sr |yi,t 1,yi,t 1
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1(m > n)max Ainjl   P itnj,SAinjlm  
1
2 P itnk
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  . 
Finally, there is the portion of benefits in n due to both members of a married couple 
leaving the labor force due to death, which is 
     
Et SSBitn
u,su |yi,t 1,yi,t 1
S        .  It is rare, but 
possible, that benefits are collected under this scenario.  It occurs solely when a widowed 
individual, whose deceased spouse worked up until death, continues working past age 70 
(at  which  point  benefits  are  collected  even  though  retirement  has  not  yet  occurred) 
eventually dies without having retired himself.  Omitting both j and k summations and 
setting each to  , this is: 
     
Et SSBitn
u,su |yi,t 1,yi,t 1
S         = ditl
m=t
 
 
l=t
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S uitluitm
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  . 
The total expected Social Security benefit for person i in n consists of the sum of 
the benefits in these four cases: 
     
Et SSBitn |yi,t 1,yi,t 1
S         = Et SSBitn
r,sr |yi,t 1,yi,t 1
S        + Et SSBitn
r,su |yi,t 1,yi,t 1
S        + 
    
     
Et SSBitn
u,sr |yi,t 1,yi,t 1
S        + Et SSBitn
u,su |yi,t 1,yi,t 1
S         
 
The expected Social Security benefit in year n for i’s spouse, 
     
Et SSBitn
S |yi,t 1
S ,yi,t 1        , is 
calculated exactly the same way as is i’s benefit, but with i’s and i’s spouse’s variables 
switched in all places.  Overall, we define a family’s total Social Security Wealth (SSW) 
as the present discounted value of all years of both the individual’s and the individual’s 
spouse’s Social Security benefits.  This is:   44 
     
SSWit(yi,t 1,yi,t 1
s ) = Et[SSBitn |yi,t 1,yi,t 1
s ]+ Et[SSBitn
S |yi,t 1
s ,yi,t 1] ( )(1+  )
 (n t)
n=t
 
  , 
 
where ρ denotes the real discount rate, which is set at 3%. 
 
Smoothed Social Security Wealth 
  The smoothed Social Security Wealth calculator modifies four elements of the 
regular calculator to eliminate the five sources of discontinuities-in-the-limit: the vesting 
rule  based  on  quarters  of  earnings,  the  35-years  rule,  the  kinks  in  the  AIME-PIA 
conversion, the choice of taking benefits from one’s own or one’s living spouse’s record, 
and the treatment of widow benefits. 
  To eliminate the discontinuity-in-the-limit caused by the minimum 40 quarters 
rule, we simply allow for benefits to be received no matter how few quarters a person 
worked. 
  To remove the discontinuity-in-the-limit induced by the 35-years rule, we allow 
for an individual’s AIME to be calculated from as many years as he works, even if that 
number is greater than 35.  The total earnings of all years are still treated as though they 
occurred over just 35 years. 
  We  develop  a  new  AIME-PIA  conversion  formula  to  eliminate  the 
discontinuities-in-the-limit that exist when the conversion rate changes from 90% to 32% 
and from 32% to 15%.  We fit a quadradic formula, PIA = a AIME
2 + b AIME + c, such 
that the following three requirements hold.  Taking the AIMEs from the regular Social 
Security  Wealth  calculator  and  placing  them  through  the  smoothed  AIME-PIA 
conversion, we require that the average PIA is the same, the average  PIA /  AIME  is the 
same, and the maximum AIME yields the same PIA as under the regular method. 
  The largest change in the calculator is the elimination of the discontinuities-in-
the-limit caused by the choice between taking one’s own benefits or taking benefits based 
on one’s spouse’s record (either living or deceased).  First, the program sorts individuals 
into eight groups by sex, marital status (married, widowed, single), and whether one’s 
spouse is retired (only applicable for married individuals).
33  It then calculates, by group, 
the average fraction of benefits that are taken off of an individual’s own record compared 
to the total that could be taken.  Thus, if widowed women could possibly take $10,000 on 
average off of their own records but, in practice, only take $1,500 on average, the fraction 
applied to them would be 0.15.
34  It then performs the same computation for benefits off 
of spousal records.  Note that there is no need for these two fractions to sum to 1. 
  The program then proceeds to calculate benefits.  However, individuals always 
take a portion of the benefits based off of both their own and their spouse’s records, and 
the portion they take in each case is equal to the fraction calculated above. 
 
Calculating INTS 
 
                                                 
33 As the program predicts further into the future, an individual’s group might change should the spouse 
retire and/or die. 
34 Taking the full $10,000 would require taking benefits off of their own records even when benefits off of 
their deceased husbands’ records were higher.   45 
  To  calculate  the  intensive-margin  net-of-tax  share  (INTS),  the  program 
calculating Social Security Wealth is run twice.  The first time, it is run normally, as 
described above.  The second time, one change is made—the current year’s earnings are 
increased  by  $1000.
35    However,  the  rest  of  the  program,  including  all  probabilities 
remains the same. 
  The  dollar  difference  between  the  second  and  the  first  calculations  of  Social 
Security Wealth, divided by 1000, is our estimate of the derivative of Social Security 
Wealth with respect to current earnings.  As described in the body of the paper, INTS is 
then calculated based on the following formula: 
 
INTSit = ln(1  0.106 /1.053+  SSWit /  ˆ yit) 
 
Calculating ENTS 
 
  To  calculate  the  extensive-margin  net-of-tax  share  (ENTS),  the  program 
calculating Social Security Wealth also runs twice, but both versions are modified—
actually, simplified—from the above description.  In the first calculation, the dates of 
retirement and take-up of benefits are assumed to be exactly one year in the future
36 (but 
take-up still never occurs before age 62 or after age 70). 
In the second iteration, a person is assumed to retire this year but take up benefits 
next year.  (Again, take-up still occurs no earlier than 62 nor later than 70.)  This is a 
modification  of  the  take-up  rule  described  above,  and  it  ensures  that  the  timing  of 
retirement between the first and second iterations is exactly one year apart while take-up 
of benefits in both cases occurs at the same time. 
The dollar difference between the first and second calculations of Social Security 
Wealth, divided by the predicted earnings in the additional year,
37 is the change in Social 
Security Wealth with respect to an additional year of work.  As described in the body of 
the paper, ENTS is then calculated based on the following formula: 
 
ENTSit = ln 1  0.106 /1.053+ SSWit(retire in t +1)  SSWit(retire in t) ( )/ ˆ yit ( ) 
 
 
  
 
 
                                                 
35 All future years’ predicted earnings are based on the original amount without the extra $1000. 
36 This applies only to the respondent, not to the spouse. 
37 In cases where the predicted income from the extra year of work was less than $2500, $2500 was used 
instead.  $2500 is therefore the minimum by which the difference between these two values can be divided.   46
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Figure 2
Expected Family Social Security Wealth
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Figure 3
Social Security Net-of-Tax Share, Intensive Margin
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In addition, there are 1283 observations with the minimum value, -0.106
 
 
Figure 4
Social Security Net-of-Tax Share, Extensive Margin
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Figure 5
Social Security Net-of-Tax Share, Extensive Margin, 
by Age of Labor Force Entry
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Figure 6
Social Security Net-of-Tax Share, Intensive Margin,
 by Age of Labor Force Entry
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Figure 7
Social Security Net-of-Tax Share, Intensive Margin, 
Spouses of Retirees and Widows
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Figure 8
Social Security Net-of-Tax Share, Extensive Margin, 
Spouses of Retirees and Widows
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 Sample Mean (std.dev.) Mean (std.dev.) Mean (std.dev.)
Earnings C 31,622 (19,580) 35,076 (20,053) 27,551 (18,186)
ln(Earnings) C 10.123 (0.759) 10.244 (0.746) 9.979 (0.750)
Two Year Retirement Hazard A 0.151 (0.358) 0.158 (0.364) 0.143 (0.350)
Hours Worked per Week A 38.82 (17.58) 41.68 (18.22) 34.97 (15.89)
Dummy for Weekly Hours≥15 A 0.888 (0.315) 0.893 (0.309) 0.882 (0.322)
Weekly Hours if Weekly Hours≥15 B 42.86 (12.08) 45.95 (12.14) 39.18 (10.91)
ln(Weekly Hours) if Weekly Hours≥15 B 3.718 (0.287) 3.794 (0.264) 3.629 (0.288)
Fraction Retired at Age 60 D 0.409 (0.492) 0.305 (0.461) 0.497 (0.500)
Fraction Retired at Age 65 D 0.759 (0.428) 0.686 (0.464) 0.821 (0.383)
Fraction Retired at Age 70 D 0.939 (0.239) 0.907 (0.290) 0.966 (0.181)
ln(SS Wealth) A 12.46 (0.35) 12.48 (0.34) 12.43 (0.37)
SS Wealth A 272,153 (80,940) 277,704 (78,901) 264,683 (83,029)
SS Wealth if Age≥62 A 300,493 (87,377) 310,742 (83,045) 279,415 (92,185)
Years of Earnings A 33.10 (8.93) 37.28 (6.75) 27.49 (8.41)
Eligible for SS with Own Record A 0.988 (0.110) 0.994 (0.077) 0.979 (0.142)
Age A 59.40 (4.63) 60.09 (4.79) 58.47 (4.25)
Married A 0.923 (0.266) 0.955 (0.207) 0.880 (0.325)
Widowed A 0.035 (0.185) 0.015 (0.122) 0.063 (0.242)
Single A 0.041 (0.199) 0.030 (0.169) 0.057 (0.232)
Notes: All dollars are 2003 dollars.  Eligibility for Social Security  based on own record occurs with 40 quarters of positive earnings for individuals born in 1928 
or later, fewer for individuals born in 1920-1927.  Sample A is the sample in the retirement regressions and contains 13,902 person*year observations (7975 
men and 5927 women) from 3971 unique persons (2269 men and 1702 women).  Sample B is the sample in the hours regressions and contains 10,840 
person*year obserations (5891 men and 4949 women) from 3152 unique persons (1731 men and 1421 women).  Sample C is the sample in the earnings 
regressions and contains 11,062 person*year observations (5984 men and 5078 women) from 3467 unique persons (1911 men and 1556 women).  Sample D 
is the entire HRS cohort with reliable earnings and retirement data and contains 8337 unique persons (4508 men and 3829 women).
Table 1
Selected Summary Statistics
Entire Sample Men WomenNumber 
of Obs. Mean
Standard 
Deviation Mean
Standard 
Deviation Mean
Standard 
Deviation
Panel A: Whole Sample
All Observations 13902 272,153 (80940) -0.037 (0.045) -0.054 (0.050)
All Men 7975 277,704 (78901) -0.029 (0.047) -0.048 (0.051)
All Women 5927 264,683 (78901) -0.048 (0.039) -0.063 (0.051)
Panel B: Men Only
By Work History:
  35 Years of Work or Fewer 2335 224,758 (74636) -0.008 (0.047) -0.007 (0.060)
  More than 35 Years of Work 5640 299,625 (69685) -0.037 (0.044) -0.064 (0.034)
By Marital Status:
  Married 7619 284,469 (73481) -0.028 (0.047) -0.047 (0.051)
  Widowed 120 157,300 (40547) -0.058 (0.035) -0.073 (0.031)
  Single 236 120,521 (40883) -0.045 (0.036) -0.049 (0.046)
By Education:
  Low Education 4446 253,283 (71258) -0.026 (0.050) -0.052 (0.052)
  High Education 3529 308,471 (77296) -0.032 (0.043) -0.043 (0.048)
By Lifetime Earnings:
  Lifetime Earnings < Median 3997 234,182 (70219) -0.008 (0.050) -0.028 (0.059)
  Lifetime Earnings ≥ Median 3978 321,435 (60918) -0.050 (0.032) -0.067 (0.028)
By Ratio of Own to Spousal 
Lifetime Earnings:
  Ratio of Earnings 1st Quartile 1905 287,731 (84527) -0.029 (0.043) -0.049 (0.048)
  Ratio of Earnings 2nd Quartile 1905 292,073 (69358) -0.033 (0.043) -0.051 (0.047)
  Ratio of Earnings 3rd Quartile 1905 284,912 (66126) -0.025 (0.049) -0.045 (0.053)
  Ratio of Earnings 4th Quartile 1904 273,157 (71285) -0.024 (0.052) -0.045 (0.055)
Panel C: Women Only
By Work History:
  35 Years of Work or Fewer 4869 259,852 (81536) -0.049 (0.039) -0.062 (0.049)
  More than 35 Years of Work 1058 286,917 (86193) -0.044 (0.038) -0.068 (0.032)
By Marital Status:
  Married 5217 280,376 (73935) -0.048 (0.037) -0.064 (0.044)
  Widowed 371 153,622 (38933) -0.067 (0.048) -0.084 (0.055)
  Single 339 144,721 (55446) -0.026 (0.043) -0.028 (0.058)
By Education:
  Low Education 3484 245,974 (76626) -0.052 (0.038) -0.068 (0.044)
  High Education 2443 291,365 (84515) -0.043 (0.039) -0.056 (0.050)
By Lifetime Earnings:
  Lifetime Earnings < Median 2971 238,529 (77313) -0.055 (0.044) -0.072 (0.055)
  Lifetime Earnings ≥ Median 2956 290,970 (80238) -0.041 (0.031) -0.055 (0.034)
By Ratio of Own to Spousal 
Lifetime Earnings:
  Ratio of Earnings 1st Quartile 1305 274,723 (60057) -0.079 (0.027) -0.099 (0.024)
  Ratio of Earnings 2nd Quartile 1304 286,963 (68235) -0.050 (0.027) -0.071 (0.037)
  Ratio of Earnings 3rd Quartile 1304 291,942 (75412) -0.038 (0.029) -0.050 (0.032)
  Ratio of Earnings 4th Quartile 1304 267,880 (86973) -0.027 (0.040) -0.036 (0.050)
Table 2
Effective Social Security Net-of-Tax Shares
Notes: Low education consists of high school dropouts and high school graduates; high education consists of individuals with some college or 
a college degree.  The sample for the ratio of own to spousal earnings is limited to married individuals.  Median lifetime earnings and quartiles 
of the ratio of own to spousal lifetime earnings are gender-specific.
Log of Extensive- 
margin Net-of-Tax 
Share (ENTS)
Log of Intensive-
margin Net-of-Tax 
Share (INTS)
Social Security 
WealthEntire 
Sample Men Women
Entire 
Sample Men Women
Entire 
Sample Men Women
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0455 0.0414 0.0209 0.0375 0.0416 0.0210 0.0386 0.0430 0.0216
0.2384 0.3678 0.6853 0.3306 0.4519 0.5458 0.3422 0.4570 0.5609
0.0397 0.0330 0.0117 0.0307 0.0309 0.0142 0.0313 0.0317 0.0143
0.8115 0.7996 0.8219 0.7636 0.8323 0.7812 0.7695 0.8383 0.7972
0.0200 0.0188 0.0090 0.0185 0.0174 0.0101 0.0188 0.0176 0.0099
0.9255 0.9080 0.8543 0.9174 0.9364 0.8369 0.9188 0.9364 0.8528
0.0126 0.0128 0.0082 0.0110 0.0108 0.0088 0.0112 0.0111 0.0085
5. Baseline Controls 0.9461 0.9378 0.8645 0.9487 0.9727 0.8456 0.9503 0.9720 0.8620
0.0107 0.0106 0.0079 0.0087 0.0071 0.0086 0.0088 0.0074 0.0083
0.9742 0.9637 0.9558 0.9740 0.9847 0.9330 0.9752 0.9843 0.9400
0.0075 0.0081 0.0046 0.0062 0.0054 0.0057 0.0062 0.0056 0.0055
0.9765 0.9670 0.9587 0.9768 0.9866 0.9379 0.9777 0.9861 0.9443
0.0072 0.0078 0.0045 0.0059 0.0051 0.0055 0.0059 0.0053 0.0054
Dep. Variable: Smoothed ENTS Dep. Variable: Smoothed INTS Dep. Variable: Smoothed INTS
1. No Controls
Table reports: 
R
2 (top number) and
Root MSE (bottom number)
7. Baseline Plus Further Additional
    Interactions
6. Baseline Plus Additional Interactions
Table 3a
Regressions of "Smoothed" Incentives on Control Variables
Sample for Retirement Regressions
4. Baseline Minus Higher Order Terms
Sample for Hours Regressions Sample for Earnings Regressions
3. Baseline Minus Earnings History
2. Only Basic Demographics
Notes: In each cell, the top number is the R-squared and the bottom is the root mean squared error of a regression of the smoothed ENTS (log of the effective 
Social Security Extensive-margin Net-Of-Tax Share) or smoothed INTS (log of the effective Social Security Intensive-margin Net-Of-Tax Share) on the set of 
control variables indicated in the row.  Appendix Table 2 contains detailed information on the exact set of control variables included in each row.Entire 
Sample Men Women
Entire 
Sample Men Women
Entire 
Sample Men Women
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
0.0495 0.0505 0.0467 0.0434 0.0459 0.0359 0.0450 0.0477 0.0376
0.0852 0.0721 0.1531 0.1376 0.0607 0.2704 0.1317 0.0570 0.2498
0.0474 0.0487 0.0430 0.0403 0.0445 0.0307 0.0420 0.0463 0.0326
0.4337 0.5142 0.4701 0.5716 0.5016 0.7262 0.5757 0.5187 0.7107
0.0377 0.0358 0.0347 0.0288 0.0330 0.0192 0.0297 0.0337 0.0207
0.5471 0.5907 0.5423 0.6503 0.5878 0.7710 0.6481 0.5958 0.7526
0.0338 0.0330 0.0325 0.0262 0.0303 0.0178 0.0272 0.0311 0.0193
5. Baseline Controls 0.5752 0.6167 0.5674 0.6780 0.6164 0.7814 0.6746 0.6206 0.7652
0.0328 0.0320 0.0316 0.0251 0.0293 0.0174 0.0261 0.0302 0.0188
0.6285 0.6722 0.6066 0.7210 0.6688 0.8134 0.7167 0.6702 0.7982
0.0308 0.0298 0.0305 0.0236 0.0275 0.0163 0.0245 0.0284 0.0177
0.6432 0.6832 0.6272 0.7407 0.6933 0.8261 0.7349 0.6928 0.8088
0.0304 0.0295 0.0299 0.0229 0.0267 0.0159 0.0239 0.0276 0.0173
Dependent Variable:INTS Dependent Variable: INTS Dependent Variable: ENTS
1. No Controls
Notes: In each cell, the top number is the R-squared and the bottom is the root mean squared error of a regression of the ENTS (log of the effective Social 
Security Extensive-margin Net-Of-Tax Share) or INTS (log of the effective Social Security Intensive-margin Net-Of-Tax Share) on the set of control variables 
indicated in the row.  Appendix Table 2 contains detailed information on the exact set of control variables included in each row.
Table reports: 
R
2 (top number) and
Root MSE (bottom number)
7. Baseline Plus Further Additional
    Interactions
6. Baseline Plus Additional Interactions
4. Baseline Minus Higher Order Terms
3. Baseline Minus Earnings History
2. Only Basic Demographics
Table 3b
Regressions of True Incentives on Control Variables
Sample for Retirement Regressions Sample for Hours Regressions Sample for Earnings RegressionsControls
Entire 
Sample Men Women
Entire 
Sample Men Women
Entire 
Sample Men Women
0.658*** 0.965*** 1.046*** 0.353** -0.326** -2.651*** -6.117*** -8.461*** -12.834***
(0.075) (0.118) (0.277) (0.140) (0.165) (0.351) (0.266) (0.314) (0.880)
-0.056 -0.207 0.076 1.70*** 0.737*** -1.840*** -0.476*** -1.818*** -4.559***
(0.088) (0.150) (0.446) (0.162) (0.211) (0.430) (0.176) (0.273) (0.678)
0.066 -0.080 0.189 1.076*** 0.499 -0.721 -1.014*** -1.116** -3.081***
(0.167) (0.233) (0.551) (0.235) (0.326) (0.511) (0.307) (0.446) (0.903)
0.425* 0.231 0.683 0.015 -0.239 -0.223 -0.840 -0.613 -1.049
(0.241) (0.319) (0.575) (0.383) (0.539) (0.555) (0.535) (0.775) (0.934)
5. Baseline Controls 0.308 -0.264 0.705 0.325 0.777 -0.378 -0.594 -0.071 -0.524
(0.283) (0.379) (0.593) (0.456) (0.800) (0.518) (0.678) (1.151) (0.981)
0.053 -0.283 0.230 -0.325 -0.284 -0.814 -0.957 0.287 -0.988
(0.394) (0.483) (1.004) (0.561) (0.910) (0.759) (0.877) (1.525) (1.268)
0.101 -0.235 0.383 0.284 0.738 -0.364 -0.680 0.495 -0.566
(0.407) (0.498) (0.975) (0.560) (0.907) (0.738) (0.894) (1.586) (1.347)
6. Baseline Plus Additional Interactions
7. Baseline Plus Further Additional
    Interactions
Notes: The table reports the coefficient and standard error on the "smoothed" INTS for ln(Earnings) and ln(Hours) regressions, and on "smoothed" ENTS for 
Retirement regressions.  ln(Hours) regressions are limited to individuals who report working at least 15 hours per week in a typical week.  Earnings regressions 
are limited to individuals with at least $2,500 in earnings in the sample year.  All dollars are 2003 dollars.  Standard errors, clustered by individual, are in 
parentheses.  * indicates p-value<.10; ** indicates p-value<.05; *** indicates p-value<.01.  Appendix Table 2 contains detailed information on the exact set of 
control variables included in each row.  
Dependent Variable: ln(Earnings) Dependent Variable: Retirement Dependent Variable: ln(Hours)
3. Baseline Minus Earnings History
1. No Controls
Table 4
Effects with Different Sets of Control Variables, "Smoothed" Incentives
Retirement Regressions Hours Regressions Earnings Regressions
4. Baseline Minus Higher Order Terms
2. Only Basic DemographicsDependent Variable
Entire 
Sample Men Women
p-value 
Men=Women
1. Retirement
    Coefficient on ENTS -0.205** -0.046 -0.335*** 0.075*
    (Standard Error) (0.082) (0.115) (0.121)
    R
2 0.222 0.242 0.240
    N 13,902 7,975 5,927
2. ln(Hours)
    Coefficient on INTS 0.414*** 0.694*** -0.334 0.003***
    (Standard Error) (0.157) (0.174) (0.310)
    R
2 0.276 0.242 0.301
    N 10,840 5,891 4,949
3. ln(Earnings)
    Coefficient on INTS 0.097 0.006 0.442 0.245
    (Standard Error) (0.221) (0.264) (0.429)
    R
2 0.512 0.515 0.525
    N 11,062 5,984 5,078
Baseline Specification
Table 5
Notes: Independent variable is INTS for ln(Earnings) and ln(Hours) regressions, ENTS for Retirement regressions.  
ln(Hours) regressions are limited to individuals who report working at least 15 hours per week, on average.  Earnings 
regressions are limited to individuals with at least $2,500 in earnings in the sample year.  All dollars are 2003 dollars.  
Standard errors, clustered by individual, are in parentheses.  * indicates p-value<.10;          ** indicates p-value<.05; *** 
indicates p-value<.01.  Final column is a t-test of the equality of the coefficient on men and women.  Appendix Table 2 
contains detailed information on the exact variables included in the baseline set of controls.Controls
Entire 
Sample Men Women
Entire 
Sample Men Women
Entire 
Sample Men Women
-0.195*** -0.361*** -0.006 1.190*** 0.693*** 0.740*** 1.238*** -0.697* 2.620***
(0.066) (0.093) (0.10) (0.125) (0.144) (0.256) (0.302) (0.367) (0.534)
-0.127* -0.075 -0.222** 1.031*** 0.754*** 0.419 -0.396*** -1.018*** -0.089
(0.070) (0.092) (0.112) (0.136) (0.154) (0.264) (0.133) (0.172) (0.253)
-0.062 -0.034 -0.208 0.619*** 0.575*** 0.186 0.287 -0.260 1.705***
(0.077) (0.105) (0.128) (0.141) (0.158) (0.315) (0.198) (0.238) (0.394)
-0.219*** -0.063 -0.377*** 0.304* 0.563*** -0.447 0.072 -0.030 0.370
(0.079) (0.110) (0.122) (0.156) (0.173) (0.312) (0.212) (0.256) (0.415)
5. Baseline Controls -0.205** -0.046 -0.335*** 0.414*** 0.694*** -0.334 0.097 0.006 0.442
(0.082) (0.115) (0.121) (0.157) (0.174) (0.310) (0.221) (0.264) (0.429)
-0.223*** 0.007 -0.362*** 0.315** 0.608*** -0.390 0.053 0.015 0.319
(0.086) (0.124) (0.129) (0.160) (0.176) (0.330) (0.241) (0.290) (0.461)
-0.193** 0.004 -0.320** 0.270* 0.532*** -0.287 0.035 -0.011 0.320
(0.086) (0.124) (0.130) (0.162) (0.181) (0.341) (0.245) (0.295) (0.469)
7. Baseline Plus Further Additional
    Interactions
Dependent Variable: Retirement Dependent Variable: ln(Hours)
4. Baseline Minus Higher Order Terms
Notes: The table reports the coefficient and standard error on the INTS for ln(Earnings) regressions, the INTS for ln(Hours) regressions, and the ENTS for 
Retirement regressions.  ln(Hours) regressions are limited to individuals who report working at least 15 hours per week, on average.  ln(Earnings) regressions are 
limited to individuals with at least $2,500 in earnings in the sample year.  All dollars are 2003 dollars.  Standard errors, clustered by individual, are in parentheses. 
* indicates p-value<.10; ** indicates p-value<.05; *** indicates p-value<.01. Appendix Table 2 contains detailed information on the exact set of control variables 
included in each row.  
1. No Controls
Dependent Variable: ln(Earnings)
3. Baseline Minus Earnings History
2. Only Basic Demographics
6. Baseline Plus Additional Interactions
Table 6
Effects with Different Sets of Control Variables, True Incentives
Retirement Regressions Hours Regressions Earnings RegressionsPanel A: Retirement Regressions (ENTS)
1. Baseline -0.205** (0.082) -0.046 (0.115) -0.335*** (0.121)
2. Smoothed Retirement Incentive Controls -0.243*** (0.084) -0.024 (0.120) -0.377*** (0.122)
3. Earnings-Based Retirement Definition -0.135* (0.081) -0.031 (0.113) -0.183 (0.122)
4. Retirement Definition Based on Self-reports -0.209** (0.098) -0.303** (0.141) -0.180 (0.149)
5. Probit of Baseline Regression -0.185** (0.076) -0.092 (0.106) -0.282 (0.444)
6. No Windsorization of ENTS -0.135*** (0.040) -0.066 (0.058) -0.175*** (0.066)
7. Windsorize ENTS at 0.10 (top 1.7%) -0.271*** (0.105) -0.088 (0.154) -0.384** (0.155)
Panel B: Hours Regressions (INTS)
1. Baseline 0.401** (0.157) 0.694*** (0.174) -0.334 (0.310)
2. Smoothed Retirement Incentive Controls 0.398** (0.162) 0.685*** (0.176) -0.307 (0.320)
3. Earnings-Based Retirement Definition 0.383** (0.163) 0.720*** (0.182) -0.372 (0.307)
4. Retirement Definition Based on Self-reports 0.144 (0.151) 0.410** (0.162) -0.450 (0.319)
5. Hours≥10 0.327* (0.168) 0.691*** (0.181) -0.602* (0.353)
6. Hours≥20 0.295** (0.150) 0.528*** (0.169) -0.252 (0.294)
7. Windsorize INTS at 0.10 (top 1.2%) 0.222 (0.149) 0.429*** (0.163) -0.254 (0.305)
Panel C: Earnings Regressions (INTS)
1. Baseline 0.097 (0.221) 0.006 (0.264) 0.442 (0.429)
2. Smoothed Retirement Incentive Controls 0.145 (0.228) 0.010 (0.277) 0.509 (0.430)
3. Earnings-Based Retirement Definition 0.227 (0.235) 0.144 (0.279) 0.477 (0.463)
4. Retirement Definition Based on Self-reports -0.104 (0.228) 0.113 (0.279) -0.309 (0.476)
5. Cut-off $5000 0.016 (0.203) -0.054 (0.242) 0.293 (0.393)
6. Cut-off $1000 0.138 (0.239) 0.019 (0.288) 0.664 (0.468)
7. Windsorize INTS at 0.10 (top 1.2%) 0.128 (0.257) -0.081 (0.309) 0.751 (0.499)
Table 7
Robustness Checks 
Notes: Independent Variable is ENTS in Panel A and INTS in Panels B and C.  All dollars are 2003 dollars. Standard errors, clustered by 
individual, are in parentheses.  * indicates p-value<.10; ** indicates p-value<.05; *** indicates p-value<.01.  Regression controls are as in 
Table 5.  Probit regressions report marginal effects.  Windsorizing ENTS at 0.10 affects 1.7% of observations. Windsorizing INTS at 0.10 
affects 1.2% of observations. Except where noted, regressions in Panel B are limited to individuals who work at least 15 hours in a typical 
week.  "Hours≥10" regressions limit the sample to individuals who work at least 10 hours in a typical week, likewise for "Hours≥20" 
regressions.  Except where noted, regressions in Panel C are limited to individuals with at least $2,500 in earnings in the sample year. " Cut-off 
$5,000" regressions limit the sample to individuals reporting at least $5,000 of earnings in the year of observation, likewise for "cut-off $1,000" 
regressions.  Retirement definitions are explained in Appendix 1.
Entire Sample Men WomenReason
Persons 
Dropped
Persons 
Remaining
Person*Years 
Dropped
Person*Years 
Remaining
PANEL A:
Initial HRS observations 30,207
Not in original cohort of HRS 17,625 12,582
Not linked to SSA records 3,113 9,469
Born before 1920 (different Social Security rules) 45 9,424
Reported as married in initial wave & spouse is 
present, but spouse not linked to SSA records 1,087 8,337 49,897
Retired before wave of observation (if before wave 1, 
all person*years dropped) 1,421 6,916 20,201 29,696
Missing education or race data 9 6,907 38 29,658
Respondent or spouse younger than 40 212 6,695 1,021 28,637
Respondent or spouse reports ever being disabled 581 6,114 1,850 26,787
More than 10 years of non-FICA-covered work.  
(Possibly subject to Windfall Elimination Provision) 81 6,033 469 26,318
Reports being unmarried, but reports spousal data 57 5,976 402 25,916
Widowed, but no information on deceased spouse 252 5,724 1,245 24,671
Marital status reported as divorced or separated (and 
either never remarried or remarried after age 60) 725 4,999 3,374 21,297
Respondent is younger than 52 228 4,771 2,660 18,637
Weak labor force attachment prior to entering HRS (2 
of past 5 years or previous year earnings < $2500) 800 3,971 4,735 13,902
Resulting Sample for Retirement Regressions 3,971 13,902
PANEL B:
Retirement Regressions Sample 3,917 13,902
Respondent's predicted earnings in year of 
observation is above SS taxable maximum 302 3,669 1,687 12,215
Respondent reports fewer than 15 hours per week in 
year of observation 517 3,152 1,375 10,840
Resulting Sample for Hours Regressions 3,152 10,840
PANEL C:
Retirement Regressions Sample 3,917 13,902
Respondent's predicted earnings in year of 
observation is above SS taxable maximum 302 3,669 1,687 12,215
Respondent reports less than $2500 in earnings in 
year of observation 202 3,467 1,153 11,062
Resulting Sample for Earnings Regressions 3,467 11,062
Appendix Table 1
Sample Selection Criteria Zt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Determinants 
Of Labor 
Supply Not in 
SS Benefit 
Calculator
Last Year's 
Earnings
Demo-
graphics 
Relevant to 
SS Benefit 
Calculator
Spousal 
Variables 
Relevant to 
SS Benefit 
Calculator
Earnings 2-52 
Years Ago
Aggregates 
of Yearly 
Earnings
Higher 
Order Terms
Interactions of 
Education 
and Lifetime 
Earnings
Dummies for 
Last Year's 
Earnings 
Percentile
Interaction of 
Previous 5 
Years' Earnings
Total 
Variables 
(excluding 
colinear 
terms)
Specification (48 vars) (2 vars) (102 vars) (200 vars) (102 vars) (12 vars) (18 vars) (64 vars) (99 vars) (320 vars)
No Controls 0
Only Basic Demographics X Partial 12
Baseline Minus Earnings History X X X X Partial 303
Baseline Minus Higher Order Terms X X X X X X 415
Baseline Controls X X X X X X X 433
Baseline Plus Additional Interactions X X X X X X X X X 581
Baseline Plus Further Additional Interactions X X X X X X X X X X 836
Column 6: Aggregates of Yearly Earnings consist of 2 variables for Expected SS Wealth, 4 variables for lifetime earnings interacted with sex, 4 variables for spousal lifetime earnings interacted 
with sex, 2 variables for the number of years worked in total by the respondent and spouse.  Lifetime earnings consist of the present discounted value of all personal SS-eligible earnings (using a 
3% real discount rate).  In the "Baseline Minus Earnings History" regressions, only the Expected SS Wealth variables are included.
Column 10: Interaction of Previous 5 Years of Earnings denotes dummies for each separate marital status (and whether spouse is retired, in the case of married individuals) by sex and by age 
category (0-62, 63-65, 66-69, and 70+) cell interacted with the 10 variables measuring earnings in the past 5 years.  
Column 9: Last year's earnings percentile are based on personal (SS-eligible) earnings.  
Column 8: Log of lifetime earnings and education dummies are interacted with dummies for each separate marital status by sex and by age category.
Column 7: Higher Order Terms are 2 variables of second and third order terms of Social Security wealth, 8 variables of second and third order terms of lifetime income interacted with sex for both 
the respondent and spouse, 4 variables of second order terms of current job tenure for the respondent and spouse, and 4 varibles of second and third order terms of total years of labor force 
experience for the respondent and spouse.
Column 5:  Earnings 2-52 Years Ago include 102 variables for earnings for each of the past 52 years except the most recent year.
Interactions and higher-order terms of Xt-1
Column 1: Determinants of Labor Supply Not in SS Benefit Calculator include 2 variables for family assets, 10 dummies for Census region of residence, 32 dummies indicating the longest industry 
and occupation of the respondent, a dummy for veteran status, a dummy for having been born in the USA, and 2 variables for own and spousal tenure at the longest job.
Appendix Table 2
Sets of Control Variables
Notes: Numbers of variables in parentheses in each column include those dropped due to collinearity, but the Total Variables column excludes them. Earnings are real personal SS-eligible 
earnings in 2003 dollars. Controls for dollar-denominated variables consist of the log of that variable for amounts (in 2003 dollars) of at least $1000 and zero otherwise, and an indicator for the 
amount being at least $1000.  Details on the exact control variables in each column follow.     
Column 4:  Spousal Variables Relevant to the SS Benefit Calculator include 2 variables for whether and the number of years the spouse has been retired, 104 variables for earnings for each of the 
past 52 years, 86 age*sex dummies, 1 variable for the age difference with the respondent, 4 education dummies, and 3 race dummies.
Column 3: Demographics Relevant to the SS Benefit Calculator include 3 dummies for race, 4 dummies for education (no HS degree, HS degree, some college, college graduate), 4 dummies for 
marital status, 7 dummies for year of observation, 82 age*sex dummies, and 2 for a quadratic in age (which is collinear in all but the "Only Basic Demographics" specification). Race, education, 
and sex enter the calculator because life expectancy depends on these variables.  In the "Only Basic Demographics" specification, only dummies for education, dummies for marital status, 
dummies for race, and a quadratic in age are included.
Components of Xt-1
Column 2:  Last Year's Earnings include a dummy for whether indexed Social Security earnings were at least $1000 in the previous year and a variable for the amount of indexed Social Security 
earnings.